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Management practices at investment management 
companies serving the largest endowments at 
institutions of higher education differ markedly from 
such practices at institutions with smaller 
endowments. Moreover, they differ from management 
practices in place for other, similarly-sized 
endowments outside of higher education, because of the 
unique circumstances of higher education. These 
management practices include the overall organization 
of the investment companies, portfolio composition 
management, and the creation and enforcement of 
investment and spending policies and strategies. In 
 vii
this multiple site case study, the research examined 
three such investment management companies: the 
University of Texas Investment Management Company, 
Duke University Management Company, and Harvard 
Management Company. The study found considerable 
variation in the management practices among the three 
companies, especially with respect to the extent to 
which funds were managed internally or externally. 
Further, the three investment management companies are 
organizationally and physically separated from the 
educational institutions they serve; this raises 
interesting questions about whether such structural 
separation is appropriate for both private and public 
universities, given the differing degree of external 
involvement in institutional affairs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Statement of the 
Problem 
INTRODUCTION 
Management practices in place at investment 
companies serving the largest endowments at 
institutions of higher education differ markedly from 
such practices at institutions with smaller 
endowments. Moreover, they differ from management 
practices in place for other, similarly sized 
endowments outside of higher education, because of the 
unique circumstances of higher education. These 
management practices include the overall organization 
of the investment companies, portfolio composition 
management, and the creation and enforcement of 
investment and spending policies and strategies. 
The primary focus of this research was on the 
investment management entities of the University of 
Texas System, Duke University, and Harvard University. 
These institutions were chosen because of the large 
size of their endowments and because of the similar 
nature of their investment management entities. In 
addition, the University of Texas System patterned the 
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formation of its endowment management company on that 
of Duke University, and Duke University patterned the 
formation of its endowment management company on that 
of Harvard University. The University of Texas System 
is the only public institution included in this group, 
in part because it was the first public university 
system to form a separate investment management 
company. Further, it was the largest public 
institution with a separate investment management 
company, and its endowment was comparable in size to 
the other members of the group. A recent history of 
the management of the endowment of Yale University 
(Swensen, 2000) provided an archetype against which 
the other institutions in this study were compared.  
Looking toward the immediate and long-term 
future, and with the dot-com boom and subsequent bust 
over the past several years in mind, how well-prepared 
are institutions of higher education to endure a 
prolonged bear market, given the role of endowment 
earnings in meeting operational expenses? Will it be 
enough to follow existing spending policies as they 
currently apply in years of lean capital appreciation? 
Or are the policies that provided for such dramatic 
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returns in recent years insufficient to shepherd these 
funds through difficult economic times? 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Investment management practices are increasingly 
important as institutions of higher education amass 
ever larger fortunes, and as ordinary citizens become 
more involved in, and informed about, the variety of 
investment instruments available, ranging from stocks 
and bonds to private investments, money market funds, 
real estate, derivative instruments, hedge funds, and 
various alternative investments. The relatively recent 
empowerment of ordinary citizens to trade their own 
investment portfolios in the securities markets, just 
as readily as they used to deposit and withdraw funds 
from their bank accounts, increases the likelihood 
that investment management strategies of institutions 
of higher education will be scrutinized by more and 
more donors, not just the wealthy ones. Such scrutiny 
is even more pronounced at large public institutions, 
such as the University of Texas System. 
It is therefore beneficial to determine what 
these management practices are, whether they are 
likely to be generalizable and applicable to smaller 
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educational endowments, and whether there is 
significant differentiation in management practices 
even within the rarefied strata of the largest 
educational endowments, some of which are valued in 
the neighborhood of $10 billion. It is also useful to 
determine how and why these large educational 
endowments are managed differently than other funds of 
comparable size outside higher education, to see 
whether non-educational fund management offers any 
techniques or strategies that might be of use in 
higher education. (This analysis of endowment 
management outside higher education is brief, but an 
effort has been made to identify any practices 
conspicuous by their absence from higher education 
endowment management.) Further, it is important to 
evaluate all of these policies with respect to ethical 
considerations, especially regarding investments that 
might conflict with the mission and goals of the 
universities being served by these endowments. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions that drove this 
study were as follows: What are the differences in 
organizational structures and in management practices 
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for the largest higher education endowments versus 
those at institutions with smaller endowments? How are 
institutional investment policies constructed to 
achieve the goals of the endowment fund, including 
capital preservation and growth, a steady revenue 
stream, and ensuring an ethical standard consistent 
with the mission and goals of the institutions they 
serve? What considerations led to the formation of the 
University of Texas Investment Management Company 
(UTIMCO) as the first separate entity responsible for 
managing endowment funds on behalf of a public 
university system? 
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Given the greater emphasis on UTIMCO versus HMC 
and DUMAC in Chapter 4, it could reasonably be argued 
that this work represents a single case study on 
UTIMCO, including significant comparative data from 
DUMAC and HMC. On the other hand, the rest of the work 
is intended to balance the treatment of the three 
entities such that useful comparisons can be made for 
large educational endowment management in general. 
This study did not focus on the raising of funds 
per se. Fund raising was addressed indirectly in 
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connection with the relationship between the fund 
raising function and the investment management 
function. 
Several topics briefly introduced in this study 
could be expanded upon in much greater detail: Modern 
Portfolio Theory, the Uniform Management of 
Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA), and alternative 
investments could each be treated in considerable 
detail. This study was not intended to be an 
introduction to investment management in general; 
rather it was targeted specifically at three of the 
largest educational endowments in the United States.  
This study considered management practices at 
three of the largest educational endowments in the 
United States: the University of Texas System, Duke 
University, and Harvard University. The management of 
the Yale University endowment served as a point of 
comparison, since a fairly detailed book on investment 
management practices at Yale had already been written 
(Swensen, 2000). The present study was qualitative in 
nature, in that it was an in-depth analysis of a small 
number of institutions. A statistical analysis 
treating a large number of medium-sized institutions 
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was completed in 1999 (Bruce, 1999), and the present 
study represents an addition to the overall literature 
on educational endowments. Since the work of Bruce 
dealt with institutions whose endowments ranged from 
$100 to $400 million, this additional research on 
larger endowments is needed so that students, 
scholars, and administrators in higher education will 
have additional tools at their disposal to make 
informed recommendations and decisions about ensuring 
the fiscal health of their institutions. This study 
made use of articles, books, electronic resources, and 
personal interviews and correspondence with endowment 
management professionals at the institutions being 
analyzed.  
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II contains a selective review of the 
literature on endowment management, driven largely by 
the excellent literature review conducted by Bruce 
(1999) and informed by Swensen (2000). 
Chapter III describes the research methodology of 
this study and explains why a qualitative approach was 
chosen. 
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Chapter IV explains the results of the study, 
focusing primarily on interviews conducted with 
several professionals in the fields of investment 
management and higher education. 
Chapter V includes an analysis and critique of 
the findings of the study, as well as recommendations 
for further study. 
Appendix A defines the different sorts of 
endowments and similar funds. 
Appendix B provides a glossary of investment 
management terms deemed to be most relevant to 
endowment management in higher education. 
Appendix C contains the interview protocol used 
at each interview. 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Conversations with colleagues about this research 
project inevitably involved questions about the 
origins of the endowment funds at the institutions 
studied; before identifying some of the more salient 
literature on endowment management, let us begin with 
a brief account of the early days of the endowments at 
Harvard, Duke, and the University of Texas. 
Harvard University’s Endowment 
The wealth of educational institutions in the 
United States accumulated slowly. Though Rudolph 
(1990, p. 4) and Mather (1702/1820, p. 4) differ 
somewhat on the precise dates, the Massachusetts 
General Court made an initial allocation of £400 on or 
about September 8, 1636, and the same Court passed the 
legislative act creating the precursor of Harvard 
College on or about October 28, 1636. Two years later, 
while dying from consumption (Mather, 1702/1820, p. 
4), John Harvard bequeathed “£779 17s 2d” from his 
estate, prompting the renaming of the institution in 
his name. That gift from John Harvard, however, was 
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“spent rather than invested” (Land, 1936, p. xi). In 
1640 the Court “granted to Harvard College, in 
perpetuity, the right of ferry [i.e., the right to 
collect tolls for passage] between Charlestown and 
Boston” which was “…regarded and intended to meet the 
growing wants of an institution…” (Eliot, 1848, p. 12; 
see also 36 U.S. 420 (1837) (USSC+)).  
By 1833 Harvard “received its last grant from any 
public body,” and by June, 1935, its invested funds 
totaled over $128,000,000. Proceeds from those 
invested funds, when combined with gifts, provided 
full support for Harvard (Land, 1936, p. xi). But 
Brubacher and Rudy note that, even by the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, the estimated total productive 
funds of all institutions of higher learning in the 
United States was less than half a million dollars 
(1977, p.377).  
During the roughly 40-year tenure of Harvard 
President Charles W. Eliot between 1868-1909, the 
endowment grew from $2.3 to $22.5 million (Harvard 
College, 2001). 
Harvard Management Company (HMC) was founded in 
1974 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Harvard 
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University, charged with the task of managing 
Harvard’s endowment, pension, working capital, and 
planned giving accounts; as of this writing it had a 
staff of 175, with a 13-member Board of Directors 
appointed by the President and Fellows of Harvard. The 
Chief Executive Officer of HMC reported directly to 
the HMC Board, and reporting to the CEO were 
department heads in Trusts & Gifts, External 
Management, Domestic Equity, Foreign Equity, Emerging 
Markets, Commodities, Domestic Bonds, and Foreign 
Bonds. Administrative departments within HMC included 
a Chief Operations Officer, a Chief Information 
Officer, and a Chief Risk Officer (HMC, 2002). As of 
June 30, 2001, the value of Harvard’s endowment was 
$17,950,843,000 (Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac 
2002-2003, August 30, 2002, p. 35). 
Duke University’s Endowment 
North Carolina’s tobacco magnate Washington Duke 
gave some of the most substantial early gifts to 
Trinity College in the 1890’s. In recognition of the 
Duke family’s continued contributions toward the 
institution and James B. Duke’s creation of The Duke 
Endowment in 1924, the institution was renamed Duke 
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University. The initial $40 million Duke Endowment was 
created to benefit “hospitals, orphanages, the 
Methodist Church, three colleges, and a university 
built around Trinity College,” according to Duke 
University Archivist William E. King (King, 2001, 
p.1).  
While some proceeds continue to flow to Duke 
University (among other recipients) from the Duke 
Endowment, there exists a separate, internal endowment 
designated exclusively for the benefit of Duke 
University. Duke University’s Board of Trustees 
created the Duke University Management Company (DUMAC) 
in 1989 as a “separate, non-profit support corporation 
of Duke University” with sole responsibility for 
managing the investment assets of that endowment (Duke 
University Management Company, 2002).  
As of March, 2003, internal responsibilities at 
DUMAC were divided among three organizational groups: 
(1) public investments, (2) private investments, and 
(3) finance and administration. A 10-member Board of 
Directors governed DUMAC’s 25 employees; six of those 
Directors were Duke University Trustees and/or 
investment management professionals. Four ex-officio 
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members of the DUMAC Board of Directors included the 
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Duke University, 
the President of Duke University, the President of 
DUMAC, and the Executive Vice President of the 
University. The 10-member Board met quarterly and the 
Board’s Executive Committee held monthly meetings. 
Major endowment pools managed by DUMAC included the 
Long-Term Endowment Pool (LTP), with approximately 
$3.4 billion in assets; the Employees’ Retirement Pool 
(ERP), with approximately $659 million in assets; the 
Intermediate Term Pool (ITP); and the Institutional 
Reinvestment Account (IRA), also known as the working 
capital pool. Trustees established the long-term 
annual return objective for the LTP at 5.5% after 
inflation, with a goal of spending 5.5% of the 
endowment’s average market value for the preceding 
three years (Duke University Management Company, 
“Structure and Governance,” “Assets Managed,” and “The 
Endowment Challenge,” 2002). 
University of Texas System’s endowment 
As of March, 2003, the largest endowment fund for 
higher education in the state of Texas was the 
Permanent University Fund (PUF), whose beneficiaries 
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included 13 component institutions of the University 
of Texas System and 11 component institutions of the 
Texas A&M University System (UTIMCO 2002a, pp. 19,22). 
The PUF was established in 1876, composed primarily of 
over one million acres in land grants (UTIMCO 2002b, 
p. 1). That original land grant was increased by an 
additional one million acres in 1883, and by 1901 
(coinciding with the discovery of oil on Spindletop 
Hill in 1901 near modern-day Beaumont, Texas), the 
state legislature had granted further control over 
mineral interests in the PUF land holdings. In 1931, 
legislation allocated one third of the PUF income to 
Texas A&M University, and two thirds to the University 
of Texas (UTIMCO, 2002b, p. 2). Between 1923 and 2001, 
over $5.6 billion was directed from the PUF proceeds 
to the Available University Fund (AUF), which was in 
turn expended towards (a) debt service on PUF bonds 
for capital expenditures and (b) academic excellence 
programs, ranging from library enhancements to 
classroom equipment to student financial aid. In 1984, 
a state constitutional amendment enlarged the bonding 
capacity to 30% of PUF asset value at the time of 
issuance (20% for UT, 10% for A&M), with $977.3 
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million in outstanding bonds as of the 2001 Annual 
Report, and rated as AAA or Aaa by leading bond 
authorities (UTIMCO, 2002a, p. 22). Such PUF bonds are 
issued “to finance construction and renovation 
projects, major library acquisitions, and educational 
and research equipment” for participating institutions 
(UTIMCO, 2002a, p. 22). As of the 2001 annual report, 
the PUF had grown to over $7.5 billion, including a 
portfolio of “broadly defined equity, fixed income, 
and absolute return investments” (UTIMCO, 2002a, p. 
23). Passage of Proposition 17 in 1999 amended the 
Texas Constitution to permit distributions from the 
PUF to the AUF on a “total return” basis, which 
included income and capital gains. These distributions 
were between 4.5% and 4.75% of total PUF returns as of 
2001 (UTIMCO, 2002a, p. 23). 
UTIMCO AND THE OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR: 1996 REVIEW OF 
CONTROLS 
A report by the Office of the State Auditor 
(Alwin, 1996), filed roughly nine months after 
UTIMCO’s March 1996 founding, highlighted many of the 
issues raised in news stories concerning UTIMCO’s 
management of the PUF (Permanent University Fund) and 
other endowments. The report included remarks about 
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the former Office of Asset Management (OAM), as well 
as remarks about the transition from the OAM to 
UTIMCO.  
Key findings in that report included 
recommendations that (1) the Board of Regents of the 
University of Texas System “consider using an 
independent investment consultant” (Alwin, 1996, p. 
95) to avoid relying solely on recommendations from 
UTIMCO and that (2) “adequate documentation of 
adherence to ethics standards” (Alwin, 1996, p. 96) be 
maintained in investment files. In a more general 
finding related to several state endowment funds, the 
report recommended passage of a constitutional 
amendment to eliminate certain restrictions on the use 
of capital gains and ordinary investment income  
(Alwin, 1996, pp. 11-12). The report expressed concern 
that the creation by the legislature of nonprofit 
corporations like UTIMCO might diminish public 
accountability, especially if those corporations 
become immune to open meetings and open records laws 
(Alwin, 1996, pp. 25-26). 
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UTIMCO: DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1999 AND 2002 
After Alwin’s audit report was filed, a number of 
changes took place that might reasonably be attributed 
to the concerns expressed therein. Passage of 
Proposition 17 in 1999 amended the state constitution 
to permit distributions from the PUF to the AUF 
(Available University Fund) based on the total return 
approach, which includes income return as well as 
realized and unrealized capital gains.  
In September 2002, UTIMCO’s board unanimously 
passed a policy of “full and fair disclosure to the 
public” of all of its investments of public funds, 
whether those investments are in public or private 
securities (UT System, 2002a, p. 1). This policy 
affected future private investments and required that 
UTIMCO seek waivers of any existing non-disclosure 
agreements (UT System, 2002a, p. 1). By October 2002, 
UTIMCO made details of 149 of its “completed and 
active” partnerships available on its website, 
including  
the name of the partnership, the partners, the 
year the partnership originated, the amount of 
money committed by UTIMCO, the amount of UTIMCO 
capital drawn to date, the amount of capital 
returned to UTIMCO to date, the general partner’s 
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assessment of current value, and the internal 
rate of return (UT System, 2002b, p. 1). 
Requestors were required to complete a simple 
form, and they received the requested information via 
e-mail. In news articles, the then-CEO of UTIMCO 
conceded that the UT System Chancellor and UT System 
Board of Regents Chairman “took the moral high ground 
in demanding transparency on private investments” but 
acknowledged that this might discourage prospective 
investment partners from agreeing to private deals in 
the future (Haurwitz, 2002, p. A1). This major change 
in UTIMCO policy regarding its disclosure of private 
investments could be attributed in part to the 1996 
state audit report mentioned above, in part to a 
ruling on open records requests by the State Attorney 
General in 1999 (Cornyn, 1999), and in part to ongoing 
controversies fed in large measure by newspaper 
articles in the Houston Chronicle in 1999 suggesting a 
conflict of interest on the part of the then-UTIMCO 
Board Chairman. At the time of this writing, this 
story was continuing; as several interviewees included 
in the present study observed, however, accusations 
and assertions that may appear on the front page may 
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be retracted in subsequent articles that are much less 
conspicuous in nature.  
RECENT WORKS ON EDUCATIONAL ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT: SWENSEN AND 
BRUCE 
David F. Swensen chronicled his 14-year tenure as 
manager of Yale University’s endowment in his book, 
Pioneering Portfolio Management (2000). If each of the 
endowment management entities in this study were to 
model their policies after Swensen, would their 
endowments be better situated to weather the vagaries 
of the economy, providing a larger, steadier stream of 
income? That is one of the questions that inspired 
this research project. 
Swensen’s book considers the purposes of 
endowments, their investment and spending goals, 
investment philosophy, asset allocation, portfolio 
management, performance assessment, and actual 
investment process. Three themes recur in his 
treatment of these topics.  
First, he points out the necessity of a “rigorous 
analytical framework” (p. 3). Swensen insists on 
maintaining policy asset allocation targets by means 
of frequent rebalancing among asset classes; he 
observes that portfolios often drift from such targets 
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as various asset classes over- or under-perform. Fund 
managers must avoid “casual commitments” to their 
asset allocation targets, which can lead to “casual 
reversal” when markets churn (pp. 3-7). It is a 
critical yet commonplace mistake to model the 
portfolio targets of one’s endowment on the targets of 
comparable institutional funds, and such modeling may 
fail to take into account the specific needs of the 
institution being served. Further, investors sometimes 
make decisions to invest based on the identity, 
reputation, and personality of the co-investors rather 
than on the merits of the transaction (pp. 3-7). 
Second, Swensen emphasizes “agency issues that 
interfere with the successful pursuit of institutional 
goals,” which refers to fund management decisions made 
contrary to the best interests of the fund (p. 4). 
Trustees may seek to make an immediate impact during 
their term of office, a situation that can put the 
long-term health of an endowment in jeopardy. External 
portfolio managers may seek to make steady fee income, 
and corporate managers may divert assets for their own 
personal gain; in contrast, institutions seek high 
risk-adjusted returns. Such tensions can create a 
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“wedge between principal goal and agent actions” (p. 
5). Unfortunately, the institutional fund management 
mainstream has a typically short time horizon and 
strives to be non-controversial (p. 5). The best 
defense against the agency issues that Swensen 
describes is increased awareness of their existence 
(pp. 5-7). 
The third theme in Swensen’s book concerns the 
“difficulties of managing investment portfolios to 
beat the market by exploiting asset mispricings,” in 
other words, the challenges of active portfolio 
management (p. 6). (This active management is 
differentiated from passive portfolio management, 
which aims to maintain holdings in asset classes that 
mimic certain standard market indexes.) Swensen 
suggests that active fund managers tend to make overly 
optimistic assessments of their likelihood of success, 
but he says that, in aggregate, active managers tend 
to lose value according to what it costs to play the 
investment game. This is manifested in management 
fees, trading commissions, and dealer spread (p. 6). 
Active management requires “major” staff resources, 
and trying to employ active management strategies “on 
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the cheap” brings the possibility of material harm to 
the endowment (pp. 6-7). Even with a great staff, 
Swensen says, active management requires “un-
institutional behavior” from institutions (pp. 6-7). 
Swensen’s book does not discuss public university 
endowments, such at that of U.T. System, and it does 
not offer much of an overall conclusion; nonetheless 
it does offer a good deal of detail about his very 
successful work at Yale. 
Whereas Swensen focused most of his work on one 
institution, the study detailed in Charles Bruce’s 
dissertation (Bruce, 1999) analyzed responses from 41 
different institutions. Whereas Bruce focused on 
endowments with assets worth $100-400 million, the 
present study focused on the very largest educational 
endowments. Further, Bruce’s study had a sample size 
of 41 respondents (out of 93 surveys), and his 
research was driven more by quantitative than 
qualitative methods. Bruce’s study employed a stepwise 
regression model. He concluded that three of ten 
management characteristics, namely: (1) investment 
policy attributes, (2) managers per $100 million of 
assets, and (3) the number of annual meetings of the 
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investment committee, explained approximately 50% 
(12.9%, 21.4%, and 15.7%, respectively) of the 
relationship between investment performance and 
endowment management practices for the 41 respondents 
in his study. The remaining seven characteristics that 
Bruce studied appeared to have no apparent effect on 
investment performance (Bruce, pp. 103-106). 
Bruce’s study addressed much of the literature 
relevant to the present study.  He highlighted “the 
role of endowment funds” (p. 17), “the evolution of 
endowment management” (p. 20), “classification of 
endowment principal and income” (p. 27), “structures 
of endowment asset management” (p. 32), and “endowment 
management issues” (p. 64). His study provided a good 
organizational framework for a further review of the 
literature as it relates to the present study, and 
that organizational structure influenced the section 
headings and structure of much of the information that 
follows in the remainder of this chapter. 
THE ROLE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS: MORE THAN JUST A REVENUE STREAM 
Bruce reported that endowment income represented 
.6% of total revenue for public colleges and 
universities, and 4.7% for private institutions in 
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1995-96 (The Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac, 
1997 as cited in Bruce, 1999, p. 17). As of the 
Chronicle’s August 2002 Almanac, the Department of 
Education had issued a revised figure for revenue from 
endowment income for private institutions for 1995-96 
to 5.2%. The figure for public institutions was steady 
at .6% for 1996-97.  
This average endowment contribution towards 
revenue of approximately 5% for private institutions, 
and approximately .5% for public institutions, would 
appear to be an almost insignificant portion of total 
revenue. But Massey (1990) observes that the role of 
endowments is nonetheless vital, in that endowments 
provide for greater independence in academic program 
decision-making, they subsidize the institutional 
operating budget, and they enhance the balance sheet. 
These contributions in turn strengthen bond ratings 
and reduce the cost of borrowing for the institution 
(Massey, 1990, as cited in Bruce, 1999, pp.17-18). 
THE EVOLUTION OF ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT: UMIFA, PRUDENT INVESTOR 
RULE, AND MARKOWITZ’S MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY 
The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act 
(UMIFA), the Prudent Investor Rule (PIR), and Modern 
 25
Portfolio Theory (MPT) have had a major impact on 
endowment management (Bruce, 1999).  
UMIFA, a product of the 1968 Ford Foundation 
study of endowment management, had been passed by 46 
states and the District of Columbia as of February 22, 
1999 (Bruce, 1999). As of March 2003, all states 
except Alaska, Pennsylvania and South Dakota had 
passed some form of UMIFA legislation (Gallagher, 
2003).  UMIFA provides colleges, universities, and 
other charitable corporations with the total return 
concept, “broad powers of investment authority,” “the 
authority to delegate investment management 
decisions,” and a method for waiving restrictions on 
the use of endowment funds (NACUBO, 1980, as cited in 
Bruce, 1999). In effect, it allows fund managers to 
focus on long-term growth, not just short-term yields. 
The PIR replaced the prudent man rule in the 
third restatement of trust law issued by the American 
Law Institute in 1992. The PIR gives trustees “more 
latitude in the exercise of their investment 
responsibility,” addressing risk and return, 
inflation-adjusted real return, and investments viewed 
in total rather than in isolation. Underlying the rule 
 26
is the proposition that “no investment vehicles or 
investment management techniques are imprudent per se” 
(Bruce, 1999, pp. 22-23; see also Welch, 1991, and 
Harvard College V. Amory, 9 Pick. (26 Mass.) 446, 461 
(1830), as cited in Bruce, 1999.). It thus allows for 
a more contextual, holistic approach to evaluating the 
prudence of investments. 
Harry Markowitz first explained the principles of 
MPT in his doctoral dissertation (1956); he eventually 
won the Nobel Prize for his theories, which proposed 
combining assets into a portfolio to optimize return 
for a given level of risk. According to Dobbins, Witt, 
and Fielding (1994, p. 2), “MPT could be described as 
risk management, rather than return management.” MPT 
“suggests that diversification is rational, given that 
investors should only take on that part of risk for 
which they expect to be rewarded.” (Dobbins et al, 
1994, p. 12).  
According to Maginn & Tuttle, “what Markowitz 
focused on for the first time was the quantification 
of diversification.” Charts on perfect positive 
dependence (two assets moving up or down together), 
perfect negative dependence (two assets moving in 
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opposite directions), and imperfect, but high, 
positive dependence (two assets tending to move 
together) can demonstrate this. For example, in the 
case of two securities with perfect positive 
dependence, there is no benefit to be gained from 
diversification (i.e., no benefit in holding both 
securities rather than just one of them): the price of 
the two securities with perfect positive dependence 
moves up and down simultaneously (Maginn & Tuttle, 
1983, p. 45). On the other hand, in the case of a 
portfolio holding two securities with perfect negative 
dependence, the portfolio would have no risk. 
Markowitz’s pioneering work essentially transformed 
finance into a separate field of study (Bruce, p. 26). 
According to Anson, “asset allocation can trace its 
roots” to MPT and the work of Harry Markowitz (Anson, 
2002, p. 5). Bruce (1999) notes that an extension of 
MPT, known as Post Modern Portfolio Theory (PMPT) 
measures only undesirable risk – it determines the 
“semi-deviation or risk that falls below the target 
return for a stated period of time.” (Berens, 1994, as 
cited in Bruce, 1999).  
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CLASSIFICATION OF ENDOWMENT PRINCIPAL AND INCOME 
Bruce uses Massey (1990), Greene (1992), and 
Williamson (1975) to explain the difference between 
true, term, and quasi-endowment funds. The principal 
in true endowment funds is never expendable; that in 
term endowment funds is expendable after a stated 
period or event; that in quasi-endowments functions 
similarly, but can be expended at any time, at the 
discretion of the governing entity (e.g., a board of 
trustees) that established them. Appendices A and B 
include more details and definitions of these and 
other terms relative to endowment management.  
NACUBO’s 1996 study (NACUBO, 1997) showed that 
true endowments made up 61.4%, and quasi-endowments 
33.6%--together, 95%--of the $123.2 billion in 
endowment assets in the study. NACUBO’s 1999 study 
showed 57% in true endowments, and 36.8% in quasi-
endowments-—together, 94%--of the $195.4 billion in 
endowment assets in the study (NACUBO, 2000, as cited 
in Klinger, 2000). 
In other words, true and quasi-endowment funds 
are, by a huge margin, the most important types of 
endowments in terms of sheer dollars. Current 
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practices have expanded the concept of endowment 
principal to include both an original gift and any 
additional amount needed to maintain the purchasing 
power of that original gift (Swensen, 1994, as cited 
in Bruce, 1999, p. 30). As Swensen points out, the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Gross National Product 
(GNP) are both inadequate indices of true purchasing 
power in higher education, because productivity gains 
tend to benefit other sectors of the economy 
disproportionately (Swensen, 2000, p. 35). 
Institutions of higher education should instead use 
the Higher Education Price Index (HEPI), which better 
accounts for salaries and personnel costs in this 
sector, to determine relative purchasing power over 
time (Swensen, 2000, p. 35). 
The Princeton study (Princeton University, 1970), 
as well as the Ford Foundation Studies (Cary & Bright, 
1969, and Bowen, 1969) “laid the foundation for the 
definition of endowment principal and income as 
legislated in the UMIFA and the Uniform Prudent 
Investor Act (Bruce, 1999, p. 32).” The Princeton 
study recommended a modified definition of income for 
these reasons: 
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1) The definition of income, from an economic 
perspective, makes no distinction between capital 
appreciation and yields (dividends and interest). Such 
a distinction is arbitrary. 
2) The spending plan that allows only the 
expenditure of interest and dividend income is not the 
best way to maintain the purchasing power of the 
endowment principal. 
3) The basic issue of balancing the needs of the 
present and the needs of future generations is 
resolved by the definition of spendable income. The 
balance issue should be addressed by investment and 
spending policies that allow for a “total return” 
investment strategy.  
4) The spending plan that limits spendable income 
to dividends and interest may at times pressure the 
investment managers to select securities for yield and 
not for maximum total return (Princeton University, 
1970, as cited in Bruce, 1999). 
The Princeton study also outlined the following 
criteria for a redefinition of endowment income: 
1) Endowment principal should be protected in 
terms of its real value or purchasing power. When the 
 31
cost of higher education rises, the value of endowment 
principal should increase to cover the added cost. 
2) Endowment fund management should provide a 
cushion against market declines. 
3) The income distributed to spendable accounts 
should be relatively stable from year to year. 
4) Any change created by a redefinition of 
endowment income should be implemented gradually over 
an extended period of time (Princeton University, 
1970, as cited in Bruce, 1999). 
STRUCTURES AND STRATEGY: ENDOWMENT ASSET MANAGEMENT 
Educational endowments have certain unique 
characteristics that distinguish them from “mutual 
funds, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, 
labor union funds, and corporate profit sharing plans” 
(Bruce, 1999, p. 33). These include their tax-exempt 
status, their infinite time horizon, and the 
expectation that they will provide a stable revenue 
stream for academic operations (Downes & Goodman, 
1995, as cited in Bruce, 1999, p. 33; note that Bruce 
says “indefinite” rather than “infinite.”). As Bruce 
states, “by observing the management processes and 
practices of other institutions, especially those that 
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consistently have above average performance numbers, 
colleges and universities can determine the most 
effective endowment management practices” (Bruce, 
1999, p. 34). 
Synodinos (1992) says endowment managers should 
consider the following four ways to increase endowment 
principal: (1) increased fund-raising; (2) an emphasis 
on growth as well as income; (3) reinvestment of some 
of the return as a hedge against inflation; and (4) 
transfer of the annual operating surplus to a quasi-
endowment (Synodinos, 1992, as cited in Bruce, 1999). 
While that last opportunity may be a rare event, it is 
nonetheless good counsel. To that list, Dunn adds the 
suggestion that endowment dollars per full time 
equivalent student keep pace with peer institutions 
(Dunn, 1991, as cited in Bruce, 1999). 
In determining their endowment management 
structures, Bruce (1999, pp. 35-65) suggests that 
colleges and universities focus their efforts on:  
• formulating a thoroughly analyzed investment 
policy to guide decision-making (Ellis, 
1993; Edie & Smith, 1993; Morrell, 1996; 
Storrs, 1986; Maynard, 1996; Hopewell, 1994; 
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NACUBO, 1992; Schneider et al, 1997; and 
Williamson, 1975);  
• evaluating an appropriate investment time 
horizon, which will necessarily have an 
impact on the investment instruments chosen 
(Ellis, 1993, and Jacobson, 1996);  
• setting a spending and accumulation policy 
consistent with the goals of the institution 
and flexible enough to meet current needs 
(Schneider et al, 1997; Massey, 1990; 
Greene, 1992; Bowen, 1969; Williamson, 1993; 
Morrell, 1995; Nettleton, 1986; and Tobin, 
1974);   
• defining investment asset classes (e.g., 
stocks, bonds, cash equivalents, real 
estate, etc.) (NACUBO, 1997; Schneider et 
al, 1997; Downes & Goodman, 1995; 
Williamson, 1993; Takahashi, 1996; Russell, 
1994; Brinson, Singer, & Beebower, 1991; 
Brinson, Singer, & Beebower, 1986; and 
Massey, 1990);  
• determining whether using internal or 
external managers is more appropriate (Cary 
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& Bright, 1968; Daugherty, 1990; Morrell, 
1996; Academy for Educational Development, 
1985; and St. Goar, 1996; see also Anson, 
2002, pp. 88-92, for an excellent and 
exhaustive checklist/questionnaire for 
prospective and current fund managers.);  
• deciding upon active (i.e., specific 
security selection) or passive fund 
management (i.e., holding to an index for a 
specific asset class) (Sharpe, 1991; 
Williamson, 1993; Jensen, 1968; Ippolito, 
1989; and Elton, Gruber, Das, & Hlavaka, 
1993); and  
• selecting and monitoring managers (Green, 
1992; Massey, 1990; Ellis, 1994; Murray, 
1986; and Adams, 1972).   
Bruce (1999, p. 66) observed that studies prior 
to his own had been generally limited to private 
institutions, the sample size had been too small, or 
the study had been limited to a specific geographic 
area. Accordingly, his study included both public and 
private institutions from a broad spectrum of 
geographic locations. He did, however, omit any 
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extended consideration of the largest educational 
endowments from his study, and large endowments have 
certain characteristics, constraints, and capabilities 
not necessarily found with smaller endowments.  
Bruce’s study provided several useful insights 
relevant to the present study of larger endowments, 
but his advice, following Maynard (1996) that 
strategic investment policy development be 
“straightforward,” and that “the allocation of 
endowment assets to complex classes unnecessarily 
complicates the management process” really cannot 
apply to the largest and (necessarily) most 
complicated of educational endowments (Maynard, 1996, 
as cited in Bruce, 1999, p. 36).  
Conceding that investment policy statements will 
vary from institution to institution, Bruce highlights 
NACUBO’s general advice that policy statements should 
include: 
(a) asset allocation guidelines and a list of 
allowable assets, (b) expected time horizon, (c) 
the fund’s performance return objectives, and (d) 
the manager selection and evaluation criteria 
(NACUBO, 1992, as cited in Bruce, 1999, p. 37). 
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That advice is as applicable to the mid-sized 
endowments in Bruce’s study as it is to the large 
endowments in the present study. 
DEALING WITH HARD TIMES 
Leslie & Fretwell (1996) offer guidance about the 
lessons learned from hard times and about how to 
analyze prospects for institutional success over time. 
They employ three themes: (1) “the sources and impact 
of fiscal stress on colleges and universities;” (2) 
“their search for solutions to fiscal challenges;” and 
(3) “understanding how to respond with resilience and 
reestablish the long-term robustness of higher 
education.” (p. 3) 
Leslie & Fretwell focused on the “stressed 
financial conditions that most colleges and 
universities were experiencing between 1989 and 1995” 
(1996, p. 3). They interviewed twelve presidents from 
thirteen institutions, ranging from Pennsylvania State 
University, with 37,000 students, to Tusculum College, 
with fewer than 500 resident undergraduates (1996, pp. 
6-7). (Two of the twelve institutions shared a 
president.)  
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Among the lessons one learns from their study are 
that: (1) “the roots of fiscal stress are deep and 
complex” and that (2) “pressure for change affects all 
aspects of the institution: its mission, its 
organization, and its programs” (pp. xi-xii). Further, 
they concluded that there was no single cause of 
institutional stress; “institutions were challenged by 
a complex and interacting array of factors” (p. 165). 
They outlined several questions that CEO’s and other 
institutional leaders should be asking continuously 
regarding (1) “the effects of economic, demographic, 
and political trends;” (2) “trends in the 
institution’s financial condition;” (3) “stability, 
openness, and courage in management;” (4) the 
“vitality of educational programs;” and (5) 
interactivity among these factors (pp. 165-6). CEO’s 
and leaders should engage in methods of triage in ways 
that are analogous to the norms and protocols for 
making triage decisions in the medical profession (p. 
196). 
It is possible that such guidance will be useful 
in the near future for a number of institutions whose 
spending policies may have been revised during the 
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recent bull market, but which are insufficient to cope 
with rapidly changing market forces. With respect to 
endowment management, contrarian strategies as 
suggested by Swensen (2000), leveraging as used by 
Harvard Management Company, and flexible, responsive 
spending policies as implemented by Harvard Management 
Company would seem to offer substantial protection 
against bear markets. 
THE ETHICAL DIMENSION 
As was observed in The Ethical Investor decades 
ago,  
Schools of higher learning recently have been 
urged to manage their endowments so as to 
respond, in some fashion, to the fact that they 
own stock in companies which pollute or strip-
mine, operate in South Africa, fail to hire or 
house blacks, make DDT, napalm, and unsafe cars—
or take other action believed to impair the human 
condition.” (Simon, Powers, & Gunnemann, 1972).  
The moral and ethical dimensions of investment 
management are complex, and having a well-considered 
policy dealing with such issues is essential. Since 
the fall of apartheid in South Africa, “fewer colleges 
are using their clout as investors to speak out about 
moral questions in corporate America and the world” 
(Chronicle of Higher Education, March 29, 1996). 
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Administrators say that this is largely due to the 
apparent ambiguity surrounding issues today. "I don't 
see any black and white… I see lots of gray," says C. 
Daniel Gelatt, a member of the Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System. (Chronicle of Higher 
Education, March 29, 1996). 
Besides investments in South Africa, other 
investment segments fraught with tension include: the 
tobacco industry, the alcoholic beverages industry, 
the gambling industry, chemical companies (those who 
may be criticized for their anti-environmentalist 
leanings), and racist or sexist companies of any sort. 
Animal rights and abortion in particular can bring 
violent protests to campuses with healthcare and 
research-related investments. Such "socially 
responsible investing" seems to have peaked in the 
1970s and '80s, when many colleges and other 
institutional investors divested their holdings in 
companies that operated in South Africa (Lenington, 
1996).  But we may be in the midst of a resurgence of 
such concerns across the country. Articles about 
sweatshops in Asia producing athletic apparel for 
companies like Nike, and about students organizing 
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against investments in irresponsible companies, are on 
the increase (Chronicle of Higher Education, November 
26, 1999). 
SUMMARY 
There has been considerable work done on 
investment management theory, and Bruce’s recent work 
on educational endowments ranging from $100-400 
million offers a number of good ideas for studying a 
large number of medium-sized endowments. But this 
present study attempted to use the existing works on 
investment management theory, the work done by Bruce, 
and in-depth analyses of the endowment management 
entities at the University of Texas System, Duke 
University, and Harvard University to determine what 
portion of existing theoretical work seems applicable 
to the management practices in place at the largest 
educational endowments in the United States. Swensen’s 
work on Yale (1999), while it relies on a wealth of 
information that is perhaps unavailable to those 
outside a private university’s endowment management 
company (and which thus may be difficult to obtain for 
the other private institutions in this study), is the 
standard against which this and future studies will be 
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judged. Swensen’s work was crucial in giving the 
author of the present study a solid grounding in most, 
if not all, of the salient issues facing endowment 
managers in higher education. Perhaps the one insight 
from Swensen’s book most likely to give administrators 
pause is his observation that “productivity gains 
generally fail to benefit the human resource-dependent 
academic enterprise, increasing the difficulties 
inherent in maintaining endowment purchasing power” 
(Swensen, 2000, p. 50). To the author this suggests 
that there is a clear choice between reducing 
institutional staff and increasing endowment 
management efficiency to maintain (or hopefully 
broaden) the range of activities funded by an 
endowment. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
QUALITATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The study of endowment management in higher 
education poses certain challenges. Aggregate 
quantitative data are available from the annual NACUBO 
studies conducted on behalf of NACUBO by TIAA-CREF. 
NACUBO’s 2002 study included 654 participating 
institutions with total holdings of $222 billion: $61 
billion for public institutions, and $161 billion for 
independent institutions (NACUBO, 2003, p. 1). The 
2002 total demonstrated a decrease from $236 billion 
in the 2001 study (NACUBO, 2003, p. 1).  
But the particular portfolio strategies and 
internal organizational structures of endowment 
management entities, especially at private 
institutions, are sometimes considered confidential, 
and it can be difficult to gain access. Such 
strategies and structures can be even harder to 
discern for some of the largest endowments, in part 
due to their complexity. 
Particular instances of social science research 
can be categorized along a continuum between 
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qualitative and quantitative approaches, where 
“qualitative” refers to an in-depth analysis of one or 
a few cases, and “quantitative” refers to a more 
standardized analysis of a large number of cases, 
typically using statistical methods and mathematical 
formulae. With that understanding in mind, it is 
accurate to say that this study employed a decidedly 
qualitative approach to the gathering and analysis of 
data, following many of the general guidelines set 
forth in Patton (1990).  
A quantitative/statistical approach, such as is 
found in the educational endowment management study 
completed by Bruce (1999), may be appropriate for 
analyzing a larger number of similarly-sized 
endowments, and it is probably a very useful approach 
for applying Modern Portfolio Theory to determine the 
optimal balance of risk and return for a particular 
portfolio. Such a quantitative approach is less likely 
to be productive for studying the overall structures 
of just a few of the largest endowment management 
entities, however.  
Further, since macro-economic conditions cannot 
and will not be repeated, an endowment management 
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structure patterned on those structures investigated 
in this study would yield different results, 
regardless of the size of the endowment principal at 
the institutions in question. It is useful to 
determine what patterns emerge from analyzing the 
details of the management practices in place at these 
few institutions, but the reader should be cautious 
about interpreting the qualitative data presented 
herein, and cautious about assuming that it is readily 
generalizable to other, similarly-sized educational 
endowments. Perhaps even more importantly, any 
interpretation of the data offered in this study will 
not likely be applicable to smaller endowments that 
have less investment management expertise than is 
required to be competitive in highly inefficient 
markets such as venture capital and real estate. On 
the other hand, smaller institutions might pursue more 
sophisticated and aggressive investment strategies by 
pooling their assets with other small endowments, 
using the services of the CommonFund or similar 
entities. Though the CommonFund may tend to be more 
conservative overall than, for example, the Harvard 
Management Company, it has the capability to offer a 
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variety of risk and return configurations for client 
institutions based on client goals. 
The majority of this study consists of the 
analysis and explication of seven interviews conducted 
with endowment management professionals, university 
administrators, and other individuals affiliated in 
some way with the University of Texas Investment 
Management Company (UTIMCO), the Harvard Management 
Company (HMC), or the Duke University Management 
Company (DUMAC). These seven interviews took place 
between November 2001 and November 2002, and the three 
most relevant interviews in the sample (conducted with 
current employees of HMC, DUMAC, and UTIMCO) took 
place between June 2002 and November 2002. While it 
was not the major focus, this study also included some 
overall statistics and figures from the Chronicle of 
Higher Education available as of June 2003, since 
these figures provided additional background regarding 
how these institutions compared among the largest 
educational endowments. 
SAMPLE AND METHODS 
As is the case with many instances of qualitative 
research, the sampling method used in this study was 
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“purposeful sampling” where the logic and power of the 
sample rests in “information-rich cases for study in 
depth” (Patton, 1990, p. 169). Taking as its point of 
departure the interesting case of UTIMCO as the first 
separate endowment management company formed by a 
public university, it followed rather naturally that 
Duke University Management Company (which served as a 
model in the formation of UTIMCO) and Harvard 
Management Company (which served as a model in the 
formation of Duke University Management Company) 
should both be included in this study. Chapter 4 
devotes more attention to UTIMCO, in part because the 
author’s early research on UTIMCO helped to ground the 
author in endowment management concepts and issues, 
and in part because the founding of UTIMCO was the 
most recent of the three entities. In addition, the 
founding of UTIMCO was somewhat more complicated since 
it was intended to oversee funds for a public 
university system. While it would no doubt have been 
both interesting and fruitful to include additional 
institutions in the present study, various 
considerations of logistics and costs necessitated the 
drawing of certain boundaries. 
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The selection of interviewees could be considered 
a snowball sampling technique (Sias, 1995) in that 
some interviewees recommended that the author consult 
other specific individuals with experience at a 
particular institution or knowledge in a particular 
subject area.  
The interview technique employed was a hybrid of 
the “general interview guide” and “standardized open-
ended interview” described in Patton (1990, p. 280). 
The author created the interview protocol in 
consultation with members of the dissertation 
committee and with several investment management 
professionals. The protocol was submitted to, and 
approved by, the Institutional Review Board of the 
Office of Research Support and Compliance at the 
University of Texas at Austin. (The interview protocol 
is included in Appendix C.) In conducting the 
interviews, the author did not follow the interview 
protocol in a rigid fashion, to allow for the 
possibility that the interviewees might raise subjects 
and topics that the author failed to consider in 
creating the protocol.  
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The interaction between interviewer and 
interviewee did not delve explicitly into either 
participant’s epistemology (or over-arching framework 
for categorizing how we know what we know). The 
subsequent analysis of those interviews, however, 
included a post-modernist optic because it 
acknowledged a “radical indeterminacy” at the heart of 
interviewing, an indeterminacy “which cannot be 
overcome by any methodology” (Scheurich, 1997, p. 75). 
In other words, the author believes there is no way to 
achieve a perfect correspondence between what the 
interviewee said and the written account of the 
interview.  
As Scheurich suggests, there are multiple topics 
in play, both conscious and subconscious, during any 
interview, and the language of the questions and the 
responses can be slippery and ambiguous (Scheurich, 
1997, p. 62). Complex power relationships exist 
between interviewer and interviewee, contributing to 
the shared meaning of the interview. Given the highly 
technical subject matter, the experts being 
interviewed helped drive the discussions to a 
considerable degree. This was not an exercise in 
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aggressive investigative journalism; rather, the 
interviews were exchanges with highly intelligent, 
highly ethical, and highly competent professionals 
serving as mentors of the interviewer. The fact that 
each interview mentioned in this study took place in 
person, rather than by telephone or via written 
correspondence, greatly enhanced the ability of the 
author to interact and to clarify concepts and 
opinions with the interviewees. The author recorded 
each interview with the permission of the participant, 
transcribed each interview verbatim, and then 
categorized each section of the interview into themes 
using inductive analysis (Patton, 1990, p. 390). As 
Patton explains inductive analysis, “the patterns, 
themes, and categories of analysis come from the 
[interview] data (Patton, 1990, p. 390). In the 
present study, the interview protocol helped to shape 
these patterns and themes.   
The author conducted an analysis of the seven 
interview transcripts soon after each interview and 
sent summaries to four of the interviewees for the 
purpose of “member checking” (St. Pierre, 1999). Three 
of the interviews yielded fairly straightforward 
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background information, and the author determined that 
sufficient clarification of the subject matter had 
been achieved during the course of those three 
interviews.  
These member checks, rather than taking the form 
of verbatim, strictly chronological transcripts, 
instead represented summaries of the interviews 
categorized into themes which were suggested largely 
by the topics upon which interviewees chose to devote 
the most time and focus. In each instance where 
corrections were necessary, the subsequent summary and 
analysis was well received, and only minor corrections 
were necessary. In other words, there did not appear 
to be a substantial gap between the written account 
offered by the interviewer and the response submitted 
to that written account by each interviewee.  
ANONYMITY OF THE INTERVIEWEES 
Since each of the interviewees were actively 
engaged in university administration, investment 
management, and/or some logical continuation of their 
careers in those fields at the time of the study, the 
author designed this study and the interview protocol 
with the understanding and assurance that interview 
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participants would not be identified by name as such 
in the dissertation, with the intent of encouraging a 
frank and candid discussion of the topics. At the time 
of the study, each participant had well over a decade 
of professional experience in higher education, 
investment management, and/or a combination of those 
fields (and over three decades of professional 
experience in several cases), and almost every 
interviewee had reached the highest position in a 
large university or investment management entity by 
the time of the interview. By coincidence rather than 
by design, each interviewee was white, male, and over 
the age of thirty-five. The researcher endeavored to 
include a more diverse group of participants in this 
study, but the seven interviews included herein 
accurately reflect the overall composition of 
leadership positions at the endowment management 
entities studied.  
Chapter 4 outlines the results of those 
interviews and the themes that emerged; each section 
of Chapter 4 preserves in large measure the same 
format that the author originally used to categorize 
themes for each individual interview.
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Chapter 4: Findings 
This chapter includes an analysis of the results 
of seven interviews with individuals experienced in 
investment management and educational administration. 
The interviews were grouped into 1) four background 
interviews conducted from November 2001—April 2002 
concerning the University of Texas System’s conversion 
from internal to external endowment management, and 2) 
three primary interviews conducted from June 2002—
November 2002 with investment managers who worked on 
behalf of endowment management companies at UT System, 
Duke, and Harvard at the time of the interviews. 
Appendix C contains the interview protocol around 
which all these discussions centered. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT COMPANY (UTIMCO) 
Background Interviews 
Participants and purpose 
The author conducted four background interviews 
to gather information about the Office of Asset 
Management (OAM) of the UT System and its eventual 
spinoff in March, 1996 as the University of Texas 
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Investment Management Company (UTIMCO), a separate 
501(c)(3) entity. The careers of two of these 
background interview participants focused primarily on 
educational administration, and those of the other two 
participants focused primarily on investment 
management. Three of these four background interviews 
took place in Texas; one took place in California. 
These background interviews served to (a) expand the 
researcher’s understanding of educational endowment 
management, (b) suggest reasons and justifications for 
the creation of UTIMCO in 1996, and (c) identify key 
personnel and suitable interviewees for further 
research. 
Precursors of UTIMCO at the Office of Asset Management 
(OAM) 
The Office of Asset Management was the internal 
entity responsible for endowment management for the 
University of Texas prior to the formation of UTIMCO 
in 1996. The four background interviews on OAM/UTIMCO 
demonstrated that there had already been some 
precursors of the UTIMCO structure in OAM.  
While the governing board for the University of 
Texas System--the Board of Regents--certainly included 
highly intelligent people with proven successes in the 
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business world, those board members did not 
necessarily have significant investment management 
experience. As a result, they were not well positioned 
to oversee the work of the OAM. OAM leaders therefore 
helped drive the formation of an Investment Advisory 
Committee (IAC) composed of six individuals with 
investment management experience. The OAM, IAC, and 
the Board of Regents held quarterly joint meetings. 
Having members of the IAC present at such meetings, 
even though the IAC had no formal powers or voting 
rights, increased the credibility of OAM 
recommendations made to the Board of Regents. The IAC 
was eventually expanded to include appointees from the 
Texas A&M System, in recognition of the fact that 
certain component institutions of Texas A&M were also 
beneficiaries of the Permanent University Fund (PUF).  
Debt restructuring was a significant 
accomplishment of the OAM, reflecting its breadth of 
responsibilities. That restructuring led to the 
ability of the University of Texas System to offer 
tax-exempt commercial paper, meaning that a component 
institution undertaking a new building project such as 
a new dormitory could issue bonds backed with a 100% 
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pledge based on auxiliary unit revenue from throughout 
the UT System. UT System was able to obtain AA or AAA 
bond ratings based on this debt restructuring, so the 
cost of the debt burden plummeted.  
Early attempts at offering incentive compensation 
for investment professionals during the time of OAM 
were defeated, though some UT System regents actually 
supported the idea, according to interviewees. The 
idea of offering incentive compensation came about 
because of a trend of high turnover in OAM; proponents 
argued that incentive compensation was the way that 
the investment management industry compensated itself. 
As one interviewee noted, it would have been 
particularly easy to grant performance-based incentive 
pay for investment managers, since investment 
performance is so easy to measure. Though merit pay 
and pay-for-performance may be difficult to implement 
in other fields, it was not a reason to disallow it in 
investment management, where performance is so easy to 
determine. There was eventually a proposal that a 
separate endowment be created specifically for the 
purpose of funding incentive compensation for 
investment management professionals, but interviewees 
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stated that this proposal was defeated along with 
incentive compensation overall. The manner in which 
that proposal was defeated was unclear, but it seemed 
to the author that political pressure (either from 
faculty members, students, or citizens) was the most 
likely contributing factor. 
Reasons to split the investment management function 
into a separate company 
One justification offered for dissolving the OAM 
and creating UTIMCO was that it would provide some 
physical separation from campus and the UT System 
offices. Such separation would make it more attractive 
to potential investment professionals: it was a 
recruiting perk. Another justification offered was 
that there would be less bureaucracy in a separate 
company: for example, procuring a computer at UTIMCO 
would take a day, versus months to procure one at OAM. 
UTIMCO could also buy the best equipment rather than 
shopping for bids or selecting from a list of approved 
vendors. 
Founders of UTIMCO believed it was important to 
insulate the endowment spending policy, to prevent 
overspending in a particular year. Budgetary pressures 
might lead to a desire to change the spending policy, 
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but interviewees said that inter-generational justice 
dictates that an endowment fund must provide for each 
generation without jeopardizing the share for future 
generations. Overspending in one year would have an 
impact on many generations to come. 
Interviewees suggested that separation from UT 
System would create greater insulation from political 
pressure. Interviewees noted that certain prohibitions 
(and proposed prohibitions) on investments by OAM had 
been arbitrary or ill-considered, such as the one that 
prohibited investment in companies that supported or 
promoted certain rap music lyrics (as proposed by a 
prominent state senator). Such a prohibition would 
have had the effect of making due diligence entail 
investment management professionals listening to 
various musical recordings and evaluating their 
content. This would conflict with a “reasonable 
person” standard for prudent investment management and 
maximization of return.  
There was political pressure on OAM to invest on 
an economically targeted basis--pressure that OAM 
should try to balance the holdings in its portfolio 
across geographic areas within the state. Interviewees 
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said this was nearly impossible to achieve or to 
measure, since key investments were typically made in 
companies that straddled state and even national 
borders. Realistically, such distribution would not 
serve the goal of maximizing return on investment. One 
interviewee noted, “as soon as we became political, 
everything we might do, every investment decision we 
might make, would be evaluated based on someone’s 
political agenda. Separating the OAM function was 
intended to help us achieve that apolitical stance.” 
Another reason offered for splitting the 
endowment function was that the OAM had been viewed as 
a cost center, rather than as a profit center. “Some 
administrators did not realize you have to spend money 
to make money,” as one interviewee phrased it. For 
example, obtaining reimbursement for work-related 
travel was difficult; international travel had to be 
approved by the Governor’s office, meaning that 
performing due diligence for proposed or ongoing 
investments was cumbersome and bureaucratic. Procuring 
the right real-time tools for trading and monitoring 
market fluctuations was also difficult. 
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Under the OAM structure, legal opinions about 
potential and current investments had to be sought 
from the state Attorney General’s Office; however, 
staff in that office had little experience or 
expertise with legal issues related to more esoteric 
investment instruments like venture capital. Further, 
the use of any outside counsel had to be approved by 
the Office of the Attorney General. 
The State Office of the Controller, the State 
Auditor, and the media were concerned about a loss of 
control and accountability, and thus were resistant to 
the creation UTIMCO as a separate entity. The 
Teacher’s Retirement System (TRS), the Permanent 
School Fund (PSF), and the Employee’s Retirement 
System (ERS) were still adhering to the old state 
organizational structure, and staffers at those 
entities could not understand why OAM had different 
aspirations. Although OAM had begun to invest in 
private equities, one interviewee observed that a 
compelling reason for OAM to split--the potential for 
more effective participation in private investment 
instruments--was something that pension systems in 
Michigan and Oregon had been doing for two decades.  
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Formation of UTIMCO and the OAM-UTIMCO transition 
According to interviewees, the Duke Management 
Company (DUMAC) was the model that UTIMCO was founded 
upon; DUMAC itself used the Harvard Management Company 
(HMC) as its model; thus the UTIMCO model ultimately 
derived from that of HMC. The UT System / OAM engaged 
Cambridge Associates to conduct a study, in part to 
meet due diligence requirements for determining what 
shape UTIMCO should take; the Cambridge Associates 
study essentially confirmed the recommendations that 
OAM professionals had made regarding the need for 
UTIMCO and the advantages it could provide. 
According to interviewees, the original idea of 
forming UTIMCO came from a UT System Regent who was 
perhaps influenced by OAM officers and IAC members. 
That Regent traveled to Duke Management Company prior 
to the 1996 UTIMCO spinoff to meet with DUMAC’s CEO to 
gather information about the July 1990 formation of a 
separate investment management company for Duke.  
Interviewees suggested that the formation of 
UTIMCO came about due to the coming together of a 
small number of uniquely qualified individuals, 
including a UT System Chancellor with considerable 
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business and financial acumen, an OAM staff with 
sufficient expertise capable of founding a separate 
entity, and key individuals at UT System who possessed 
skills in governmental relations such that the state 
legislature could be persuaded by the merits of 
forming a separate 501(c)(3) company.  Leading up to 
the formation of UTIMCO, the position of UT System 
Chancellor had alternated between those whose careers 
emphasized financial expertise and those whose careers 
emphasized academic expertise, according to 
interviewees. UTIMCO came about when a chancellor 
conversant in both realms took charge--he could see 
the advantages of UTIMCO very readily. As one 
interviewee phrased it, “Regent Tom Hicks and 
Chancellor Bill Cunningham were crucial, instrumental 
in the conception and formation of UTIMCO. Dr. 
Cunningham was an exceptional leader in this regard.” 
According to one interviewee, there was a general 
recognition that UT System could function more 
efficiently if its endowment management processes 
could mirror those of professional finance or 
investment firms. Allowing for higher salaries was not 
necessarily the driving force, though interviewees 
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generally conceded that manager salaries had gone up 
after the formation of UTIMCO. It was pointed out, 
though, that the University was not officially 
constrained in terms of the salaries it could pay OAM 
staffers. Further, interviewees observed that UTIMCO 
was still enough of a public entity that public outcry 
about high salaries was still possible, and perhaps 
even likely.  
In the time leading up to formation of UTIMCO, 
there was some feeling that a separate entity might be 
able to escape some of the requirements of the state’s 
open meetings and open records laws--that is, if it 
were an independent corporation, UTIMCO might not have 
to go through the same open meetings and open records 
procedures, perhaps thereby streamlining decisions. 
But ultimately a decision made by the legal staff of 
UT System dictated that UTIMCO was still subject to 
open records laws, and UTIMCO was legally bound by 
that decision.    
Difficulties in running UTIMCO once it was established 
Interviewees suggested it was still difficult to 
retain individuals interested in a long-term career 
path at UTIMCO. Because UTIMCO was to have a limited, 
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specific scope, interviewees observed that there was 
less potential for employees to move up in the 
organization than there might have been in a large 
investment house. As one interviewee phrased it, 
“We’re not going to be opening a Dallas, Houston, or 
New York office anytime soon.“ According to another 
interviewee, it was also difficult to recruit and 
retain qualified investment professionals in a quasi-
academic setting. (At the time of the interviews, 
UTIMCO was more physically removed from the University 
than it was upon its founding in 1996, having moved to 
leased space in a downtown Austin bank building, 
across the street from UT System Administration 
offices. Interviewees suggested this had helped with 
recruitment.) Since building a successful investment 
management team might take 10 or more years, lower 
retention rates made building a team challenging. 
Interviewees said there was a very limited opportunity 
to take on additional outside capital management, 
though one interviewee observed that the $890 million 
Permanent Health Fund (PHF) created in August 1999 
with proceeds from state tobacco litigation was an 
exception. 
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Financial incentives alone were not enough to 
retain the most skilled investment managers, according 
to interviewees; they needed and wanted more 
challenging work to keep them interested and 
motivated. One interviewee suggested that UTIMCO’s 
management might need to simply assume a five-year 
rolling turnover rate in personnel. The University was 
deemed to be a “regulatory entity” by the legislature, 
so no ex-UTIMCO employee could do business with the 
University or UTIMCO for a year after employment 
separation. This made it difficult to recruit and 
retain individuals who might want to branch out into 
their own separate investment management activities, 
according to interviewees. 
Management of public funds required a greater 
allocation of time to the media, the legislature, 
various regulatory bodies, and open records 
administration. Fulfilling open records requests was 
very time-consuming, according to interviewees; one 
interviewee estimated that 40-50% of the time of top 
personnel at UTIMCO could potentially be spent on non-
investment related activities. Fulfilling open records 
 65
requests was also expensive, often requiring the 
assistance of outside legal counsel.  
Even with the formation of UTIMCO as a separate 
entity, there was ongoing bureaucratic red tape: 
during legislative sessions, top staff members had to 
be “on-call” all the time, even if prior travel 
arrangements had been made. Interviewees said it was 
not unusual to be called to provide information to 
legislators on short notice. (One interviewee 
suggested whimsically that, rather than merely meeting 
and matching the compensation available in the private 
sector, UTIMCO might need to offer “hazard pay,” given 
the nature of some of the non-investment management 
aspects of the work.) 
Continuing tension over levels of compensation 
was not limited to UTIMCO. As one interviewee noted, 
the Harvard Crimson regularly featured news stories on 
HMC’s compensation structure, even though it was 
clearly one of the most successful such investment 
management companies in the educational arena. That 
success was perhaps due to HMC’s compensation 
structure and concomitant ability to attract skilled 
portfolio managers. (Interviewees also noted that HMC 
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had to recruit in the Boston area, a major financial 
market, so it competed for some of the same managers 
that major banks and large investment houses tried to 
attract.) 
UTIMCO organizational structure; miscellaneous 
observations by interviewees 
One interviewee noted that there seemed to be a 
widespread assumption that the Chancellor of the 
University of Texas System must have proven experience 
as a professor--yet chancellors typically spent a lot 
of time raising money. (By way of analogy, the 
interviewee suggested that one does not hire the head 
of General Motors based on the ability to assemble a 
car; one hires based on the ability to run General 
Motors!) 
A key item in UTIMCO’s success, according to 
interviewees, was passage of an amendment to the Texas 
Constitution in November 1999 permitting the Permanent 
University Fund (PUF) to be managed as a Total Return 
Fund. According to the interviewees, lobbying for 
passage of that amendment represented a sizable gamble 
on the part of the UT System, because it represented a 
fundamental change in the way the PUF was viewed. By 
getting the legislature involved, the UT System risked 
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the potential passage of a constitutional amendment 
that was not what they really wanted. The amendment 
could have, for example, expanded the list of PUF 
beneficiaries to additional educational institutions, 
effectively decreasing the proportion of proceeds for 
current beneficiaries. Interviewees conceded that it 
might have been possible to apply the total return 
concept under the old OAM structure, but they said the 
change had certainly been good for UTIMCO in terms of 
the kinds of returns it could earn. UTIMCO influence 
and input was critical in the passage of the 
amendment; members of UT System’s Office of 
Governmental Affairs were also particularly helpful. 
One interviewee suggested that tobacco settlement 
money (deposited in the Permanent Health Fund and 
managed by UTIMCO starting in August 1999) would not 
have come under UTIMCO control without its proven 
track record and investment expertise. 
Interviewees suggested that formation of UTIMCO 
probably owed something to the coincidence of a) a UT 
System Board of Regents advocate; b) support of the UT 
System Chancellor; and c) a chief investment officer 
at OAM capable of running a separate investment 
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management entity. Several interviewees agreed that 
there was a good alignment in the interests, skills, 
and abilities of these leaders which helped to bring 
about the formation of UTIMCO. According to 
interviewees, that did not mean that UTIMCO was suited 
only for a particular point in time. Rather, it meant 
that the initial formation of UTIMCO benefited greatly 
from the alignment of those three individuals, but 
that the continued success of UTIMCO was not as 
dependent upon that continued alignment.  
One thing that made the formation of UTIMCO more 
palatable and attractive to the UT System Board of 
Regents was that UTIMCO could effectively be 
“unraveled” or re-integrated with the UT System in one 
day. The UT System Board of Regents could reunify the 
investment management function as an integrated part 
of the System administration if the board members grew 
displeased with the overall direction that UTIMCO 
took. 
Overall, most interviewees agreed that UTIMCO had 
a good structure at the time of the interviews, and 
its oversight board provided more stability and 
investment expertise than did the Board of Regents. 
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There was significant turnover in the Board of 
Regents, and that did not lend itself to institutional 
memory or to stability of policy, especially given 
that investments for an educational endowment should 
be made with an infinite time horizon. Not all 
interviewees agreed that the formation of UTIMCO was 
absolutely necessary for successful endowment 
management, however, and one interviewee believed that 
the OAM staff had been appropriately compensated--in 
other words, that interviewee did not see increased 
compensation as a solid argument for creating a 
separate investment management entity.  
Observations from the four background interviews 
above helped to inform and guide the discussions in 
the primary interview on UTIMCO, described below. 
Primary Interview on UTIMCO 
The primary interview on UTIMCO, conducted in 
November 2002 after all four background interviews had 
been completed, focused on (1) the individual 
interviewee’s background, (2) UTIMCO’s background, (3) 
outsourcing of fund management responsibilities, (4) 
reasons for creating a separate investment management 
entity, (5) the relationship between UTIMCO and 
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development offices, (6) restricted endowments, (7) 
ethics policy, (8) the differences between endowment 
fund management and pension fund management, (9) the 
nature of the relationships among UTIMCO, the state 
legislature, and the press, (10) spending policy, (11) 
benchmarking by asset class, (12) channels of 
communication with component institutions, (13) 
recruitment and retention of investment professionals, 
and (14) the challenges inherent in educational 
endowment management. 
 
Individual interviewee's background 
At the time of the interview, the primary 
interviewee had been working with UTIMCO less than 2 
years, with a career spanning more than 2 decades in 
investment management, including both pension and 
endowment management. The interviewee had significant 
experience in dealing with large, complex endowment 
funds. 
UTIMCO background 
The interviewee noted that the University of 
Texas System was the first public university system to 
create its own separate 501(c)(3) investment 
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corporation to manage its endowment, in March 1996. 
UTIMCO’s responsibilities at the time of the interview 
included managing and investing: the Permanent 
University Fund (PUF); various privately raised 
endowments from the UT System component institutions; 
UT System endowments; the State of Texas tobacco 
lawsuit settlement (the PHF); and other funds. A nine-
member Board of Directors appointed by the UT System 
Board of Regents governed UTIMCO. This UTIMCO board 
included three members from the UT System Board of 
Regents, the Chancellor of the UT System, and five 
outside management professionals. 
Outsourcing of fund management responsibilities 
The interviewee stated that UTIMCO used external 
fund managers for a) all domestic and international 
equities, b) all private equities, and c) some of the 
fixed income portfolio (while some fixed income was 
managed in-house). Further, the interviewee noted 
that UTIMCO managed part of the operating assets in-
house, as well as a real estate investment trust 
(REIT) portfolio. At the time of the interview, 
approximately 90% of assets were externally managed. 
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The interviewee observed that although some might 
consider the size of assets under management to be the 
main determinant of whether to outsource a management 
responsibility, it may actually be the worst, or the 
least relevant, reason to outsource fund management; 
rather, one should give oneself the best opportunity 
to earn the highest return possible. The interviewee 
suggested that, in the investment management business, 
cost alone is rarely a sufficient reason for making 
such decisions. He observed that HMC had done much of 
their investment management in-house because they 
believed they could do a better job in-house. This 
allowed their staff to have better control over the 
process, and it allowed them to be more nimble. As the 
interviewee phrased it, “Certainly they don't do it to 
save money.”  
The interviewee suggested that there is a certain 
minimum asset size, below which it becomes infeasible 
to manage in-house, and suggested that Duke’s 
endowment is probably close to that minimum. The 
interviewee noted that UTIMCO was large enough to do 
most, if not all, of its fund management in-house, if 
managers elected to do so; however, that would involve 
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paying internal fund managers salaries competitive 
with entities that could pay considerably more money 
than UTIMCO. At UTIMCO, the growth potential for 
employees was fairly limited, according to the 
interviewee. On the other hand, the interviewee noted 
that UTIMCO had been very competitive with other 
organizations like itself, especially for certain very 
highly-specialized and skilled positions.  
Reasons for having a separate investment management 
entity 
The biggest and most important reason for 
creating a separate endowment management entity, 
according to the interviewee, was that it established 
independence in the decision-making process, and the 
decision-making process rested with investment 
professionals. The interviewee observed that, too 
often, especially with public entities, there can be a 
confusion of roles. The interviewee acknowledged that 
by and large, UT System Regents were very smart 
people, and very successful people, but they were 
typically not people conversant with investment 
management concepts.  And, they did not have an 
unlimited amount of time to devote to investment 
management.  
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Thus, creating a separate entity was intended to 
make that division of responsibilities very precise, 
and to put the day-to-day tactical investment 
decision-making into the hands of professional people. 
The interviewee said that the size of the endowment 
was not really the determinant of whether a separate 
entity should be created; but, if size were the 
reason, it would mainly have to do with the cost of 
setting up the separate entity.  
For example, if the treasurer of a small 
educational institution managed a smaller endowment on 
a part-time basis, the cost of setting up separate 
office space, staff, and computers probably would be 
prohibitive. The interviewee did not say specifically 
where the line of demarcation was, but speculated that 
it was probably more than several hundred million 
dollars. On the other hand, in the case of a smaller 
endowment that trustees wanted to push particularly 
hard for high returns, it might be worthwhile to set 
up a separate entity to help achieve the appropriate 
balance between risk and return. In sum, the 
interviewee suggested that it was partly a question of 
the size of the endowment, but also partly a question 
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of the aspirations and investment goals for that 
institution’s endowment. 
While the interviewee conceded that being 
somewhat competitive with respect to salary might not 
be the most compelling reason, it was certainly one 
reason for a public university to create a separate 
investment management entity; in the interviewee’s 
words,  
If you want to be a success in this business, you 
have to compete for the best people. It's a 
business where people make a tremendous 
difference. Actually, it's almost a binary 
decision--an individual here can make such a 
difference in the value of assets. It's not a 
question of how much you should pay someone to 
try to earn that return--it's… can they earn the 
return or not? If they can't, then you don't want 
to hire them. If they can earn the return, then 
you can pay them a lot more than we (and other 
people) do, and still justify it. 
So clearly a reason--though not necessarily the 
full reason--for setting up UTIMCO was the 
compensation issue, in the interviewee’s opinion. 
Relationship between UTIMCO and campus development 
offices; restricted endowments 
Due to the number of component institutions it 
served, UTIMCO spent a reasonable amount of time with 
campus development officers, according to the 
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interviewee. UTIMCO had had a very good working 
relationship with them, and development officers used 
UTIMCO materials in their work. Development officers 
invited UTIMCO representatives to speak to groups of 
constituents, and from time to time they called UTIMCO 
staffers to ask for advice on how to explain certain 
concepts to potential donors. 
UTIMCO managed several funds at the time of the 
interview, and those funds were run somewhat like 
private mutual funds.  The Permanent University Fund 
(PUF) was managed as a mutual fund, and it benefited 
institutions in the Texas A&M System and the UT 
System. The General Endowment Fund was a pooled fund 
of 6,000+ restricted endowment assets. Because of 
restrictions imposed by the original donors, another 
group of assets called the Separately Invested Fund 
(SIF) could not be placed in the General Endowment 
Fund. In some cases, a restriction required that the 
funds be managed by a specified outside entity, in 
which case all UTIMCO did was provide oversight. The 
SIF pool of assets was very small, and everything else 
being equal, UTIMCO would have preferred that donors 
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not put restrictions on assets that required that they 
be put in that category, according to the interviewee.  
Ethics Policy 
UTIMCO’s written ethics policy had been 
established when UTIMCO was originally formed, in 
consultation with an outside auditor and with a 
consultant, Cambridge Associates. The ethics policy 
was a very important consideration, according to the 
interviewee, because UT System was the first public 
university to set up a separate entity like UTIMCO, 
and the founders wanted to be sure that others would 
want to emulate it. The ethics policy contained a 
number of industry standards, but also went beyond 
those standards to establish the highest common 
denominator. The interviewee suggested that the charge 
given to the auditor and the consultant was to exceed 
expectations. The interviewee said that UTIMCO staff 
members monitored the policy, and an internal ethics 
committee met on a regular basis to consider any 
possible violations that had occurred. As far as the 
interviewee knew, there had not been any such 
violations.  
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Ethics policy formation was an ongoing process at 
the time of the interview, and the committee met 
regularly to consider changes in the policy. Once a 
year, the policy itself and a report on the policy was 
compiled by the committee and presented to the audit 
and ethics committee of the UTIMCO Board of Directors. 
The Board reviewed the policy to determine whether any 
changes should be made.  
Employee trades required pre-approval. While 
UTIMCO did not have prohibitions on employees 
investing in individual companies, if the staffers 
were engaged in trading for the endowment accounts in 
a given security, an employee’s trade in that security 
would not be approved. Since most of UTIMCO’s assets 
were managed externally, there were no restrictions 
prohibiting investment by employees in specific 
companies. Furthermore, UTIMCO did not have any 
institutional restrictions on investments in tobacco 
companies or in other specific categories at the time 
of the interview. Rather, the policy of the Board of 
Regents stated that the investment of the endowment 
funds should not be managed to further any social 
and/or political causes. 
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Differences between endowment fund management and 
pension fund management 
Since the interviewee had experience managing 
pension funds as well as endowment funds, the 
interviewee was able to offer some observations about 
the contrast between endowment and pension fund 
management. The interviewee noted that the major 
difference between pension fund management and 
endowment fund management is in the nature of the 
liability. In a pension plan for a younger company, 
the cash flow would be positive. The company would be 
contributing to the plan, the fund would be growing, 
the plan would be earning investment income, and if 
things were managed well, it would be earning capital 
gains. Therefore, current cash flow considerations 
would not affect how the fund was managed. In 
endowment management, however, there would inevitably 
need to be an annual payout.  
At the time of the interview, UT System Regents 
had control over what was paid out each year. In that 
respect, the endowment fund was more like a mature 
pension plan than like a young pension plan. One would 
not necessarily have to meet the endowment payout with 
income, but one would have to generate a certain 
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return to enable the fund to make that payout. As the 
interviewee observed, some universities receive more 
money from gifts each year than they pay out, so the 
funds are still growing, but that may not always be 
the case. 
Nature of the relationship between UTIMCO / the state 
legislature / the press 
According to the interviewee, there may be no way 
to reduce the commitment of time to working with the 
legislature and the press, and this was probably a 
good use of UTIMCO’s time. “The legislators are very 
important people to us, and their job is to make sure 
UTIMCO staffers are doing the best job they know how 
to do with the assets under management, and that we 
are effective at it.” The interviewee said that, by 
and large, legislators are smart people, but not 
necessarily conversant in the field of investment 
management, so a lot of the time with the Legislature 
was spent on education regarding investment 
management. And, the interviewee said, it was probably 
better to focus on that role than to risk getting into 
a contentious situation because UTIMCO representatives 
had failed to explain their efforts. Maintaining that 
relationship with the Legislature was a necessary part 
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of the job, according to the interviewee, and it would 
be an ongoing effort because of legislative turnover.  
The interviewee suggested that negotiations with 
legislators were probably more intense during budget 
shortfalls. The interviewee suggested that the UT 
System would have to fight for every dollar from the 
legislature in that environment. Even in good years, 
the interviewee observed, UT System must make sure 
that its case was presented properly and that they 
were viewed positively by the Legislature--because “at 
the end of the day, they're the people who control the 
money.” 
Spending policy 
The interviewee said that UTIMCO gave its 
recommendations regarding spending policy to the 
UTIMCO Board, which in turn gave them to the UT System 
Board of Regents. Ultimately, the Board of Regents 
made the final decision on how much to spend. UTIMCO 
gave the Regents its best investment opinion, and the 
Regents had to take other factors, political and 
otherwise, into account. According to the interviewee, 
“We have to respect their expertise in that area, and 
they respect our expertise in the investment area, and 
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we just work together on it.” UTIMCO advised the 
Regents about what they thought the returns would be 
in the markets over the next five to seven years, and 
even over the longer term. UTIMCO staffers tried to 
keep expectations realistic. As the interviewee 
observed, in 2000 the equity markets were up more than 
20% a year and people started to think UTIMCO could 
continue to achieve such returns every year. The 
interviewee added that it was not a realistic 
expectation that they would experience double-digit 
growth for 4-5 years in a row, just because there had 
been two years of relatively low returns. In sum, the 
interviewee stated that UTIMCO officials had to help 
rein in the thinking about how much money there might 
be over the long term.  
Benchmarking by asset class 
UTIMCO worked with its external consultants, 
Cambridge Associates, to develop a benchmark in each 
of the asset categories in its policy portfolio. Many 
such benchmarks were fairly easy to establish, as was 
the case with domestic (U.S.) equities. In the case of 
private equities, however, establishing a benchmark 
was more problematic. UTIMCO and its consultants 
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arrived at a benchmark for private equities using the 
Wilshire 5000 Index plus 400 basis points. To do so, 
UTIMCO and its consultants looked at the capital 
market line, which essentially relates return 
expectations to risk levels. They believed that they 
could derive the risk level for private equities by 
looking at the correlation between risk and return 
across other asset categories, and they drew a market 
line (charting risk and return correlations) to 
determine that private equity would require a 
particular risk level for the expected return. To 
justify the risk taken with private equity, they 
determined that the rate of return would have to 
surpass the Wilshire 5000 Index by 4 percentage points 
per year. UTIMCO used that risk-based approach instead 
of an index to benchmark private equity partnerships. 
The interviewee said that was a better approach 
because an index sample might have been too dependent 
upon the performance of individual general partners in 
the sample.  
Channels of communication with component institutions 
The primary form of communication between UTIMCO 
and the development officers at UT System component 
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institutions, whom UTIMCO staffers viewed as their 
clients, was a Web-based reporting system. At the time 
of the interview, there was a publicly available 
portion of the website outlining the various funds 
like the PUF, and there was a secured, password-
protected portion of the Web site allowing campus 
officials to obtain specific information about each 
individual endowment for their institution. They could 
determine the current value, the rate of return over 
various time periods, and the payouts--essentially, 
all the financial and accounting information they 
might need.  If needed, they could get information 
about the General Endowment Fund and about asset 
allocation. According to the interviewee, the clients 
of the component campuses were the individual donors 
and foundations, but UTIMCO did not typically interact 
with them. Instead, UTIMCO provided material for the 
development officers to communicate with these 
individuals. 
The interviewee observed that, typically, 
UTIMCO’s contact with students and student groups was 
fairly limited, though they did talk with the Daily 
Texan (the student newspaper at the University of 
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Texas at Austin) on occasion. Typically when UTIMCO 
staffers did hear from student groups, it was in 
connection with a request for UTIMCO to divest of a 
certain investment.  
Recruitment and retention of investment professionals 
The interviewee observed that one of the forces 
working against UTIMCO in terms of recruitment was 
that UTIMCO was not located in the financial centers 
of the country (i.e., New York, Chicago, or San 
Francisco). UTIMCO chose not to be competitive at the 
top of the scale with respect to compensation. But, 
the interviewee observed, UTIMCO had many positive 
forces working in its favor. For example, many people 
prefer to work in an endowment environment rather than 
in a pension fund environment. And, many people would 
prefer to work in Austin rather than New York, San 
Francisco, or Chicago. UTIMCO was able to attract a 
number of well-qualified people who wanted to do 
something good for the University of Texas or for 
their state.  
The interviewee stated that UTIMCO paid median to 
slightly above median compensation, which allowed one 
to live fairly well in central Texas. The interviewee 
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observed that UTIMCO focused on hiring people who 
wanted to work at UTIMCO for the right reasons—i.e., 
to add value, and to do something important for a 
worthwhile entity--rather than worrying about their 
next job or their next bonus. While UTIMCO wanted 
strong, forceful, successful people, it did not want 
them to be so focused on their short-term career or 
financial goals that the organizational culture would 
become overly competitive. The interviewee observed 
that the environment at UTIMCO was very collegial and 
tolerant. The interviewee said UTIMCO staffers worked 
together as a group. The interviewee stated that they 
did not have a recruiting problem per se, by virtue of 
being related to an academic institution—but, there 
was a matter of getting the right fit between the 
prospective employee and the organization. UTIMCO was 
small enough that if someone who was not a good 
institutional fit were hired, it would tend to be 
conspicuous.  
The interviewee said the team of investment 
managers was somewhat like a baseball team, in that 
really young, talented employees could eventually 
achieve a sort of free agency. On the other hand, the 
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interviewee noted, if UTIMCO management really wanted 
to keep a person after five years of successful job 
performance, they could probably win the bidding war.  
Regarding the possibility of a portfolio manager 
spinning off a separate company and continuing to 
manage assets for UTIMCO, the interviewee said that 
this would be handled on a case-by-case basis, but it 
would require UTIMCO Board approval. The interviewee 
said that at one point, there had been a group in the 
private equities division that had wanted to spin-off, 
but the UTIMCO Board opted not to approve their 
proposal. The interviewee stated that UTIMCO did not 
offer spin-off as a possibility in terms of recruiting 
new employees. Then again, the interviewee would not 
say that it would never happen, and observed that it 
was something that the Harvard Management Company 
(HMC) had permitted in a couple of cases. The 
interviewee stated that it would probably be hard to 
make such a policy work well at UTIMCO. The 
interviewee said that the size of the UTIMCO staff 
might grow to about 35 employees and perhaps 
eventually as many as 40.  
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The challenges inherent in educational endowment 
management 
Creating a separate endowment management entity 
required a unique set of people, according to the 
interviewee, because it really was a great leap for a 
public university. There had to be a university 
administration that was willing to take itself out of 
the day-to-day management of the assets. For example, 
at the time of the interview, the assets managed at 
UTIMCO were worth more than all of the buildings owned 
by the UT System; they were the largest set of UT 
System assets. It required a strong and self-confident 
educational institution to take itself out of that 
day-to-day management, according to the interviewee. 
There also had to be a state legislature that was 
willing to pass legislation that made it possible, and 
the legislation had to be signed by the Governor. 
UTIMCO was a wholly-owned entity of the UT System, but 
it was still a private company managing its most 
significant asset. As the interviewee observed, “What 
does it look like to the average person in Texas 
reading the newspaper?” There were questions about the 
compensation of investment professionals relative to 
that of faculty members. One had to stretch all the 
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pay scales to get good investment management people, 
whether the investment management entity resided 
inside the university administration or it was split 
into a separate entity. Given how complicated UTIMCO 
was, how politically charged its formation was, and 
how conservative the state was at the time, the 
interviewee observed that it said a lot about the 
people who worked to form UTIMCO that they were able 
to make it happen.  
DUKE UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT COMPANY (DUMAC) 
The interview at the Duke University Management 
Company (DUMAC), conducted in June 2002, focused on 
(1) when and why Duke’s investment management function 
was split into a separate investment management entity 
and the reasons for the split, (2) lessons learned 
from the formation of a separate investment management 
entity, (3) the formation of a solid ethics policy, 
(4) internal versus external fund management, and (5) 
UMIFA and spending policy. 
Reasons for creating a separate investment management 
entity 
According to the interviewee, just prior to 
DUMAC’s formation, the investment management function 
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could have been described as “one full-time investment 
professional and a bunch of clerks.” (The interviewee 
did not mention a specific number of employees devoted 
to investment management prior to 1989. Prior to 
DUMAC’s founding, the investment management and 
accounting functions were woven together.) In 1989, 
when endowment assets under management at Duke 
University had reached approximately $1 billion, DUMAC 
was formed. According to the interviewee, 
institutional investment goals came first, and DUMAC 
was envisioned as a way to meet those goals. Some of 
the reasons given for forming a separate investment 
management entity were (a) a desire to move investment 
policies towards greater participation in alternative 
investment instruments, (b) a desire to extract the 
investment management function from some of the more 
administrative details of investment accounting (such 
as the finer points of account number coding 
conventions), (c) an interest in creating an oversight 
board dominated by investment professionals, (d) the 
need to adapt to an increasingly complex investment 
world in which asset classes were expanding and 
settlement windows were contracting, (e) the need to 
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be more effective in recruiting investment management 
professionals, (f) the need to move away from the sort 
of consensus-building management model required on a 
university campus toward the “top-down” decision-
making system necessary for investment management 
decisions, (g) an interest in introducing additional 
asset classes into the endowment portfolio, and (h) 
the need to insulate the investment management 
function from some donor-relationship issues.  
Lessons learned from the split 
Among the lessons learned from forming a separate 
investment management entity, the interviewee listed 
the: (a) creation of a formal, comprehensive 
communication plan, (b) professionalization of the 
back office, and (c) considerations necessary to 
choose the right custodian bank.  
A formal, comprehensive communication plan 
The interviewee said that twice each year, 
representatives from DUMAC made formal presentations 
on campus, attended by a mix of constituents including 
faculty, students, administrators, and donors. This 
was done partly for symbolic reasons, in that the 
message it sent to constituents was one of openness: 
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it took away the “cloud of mystery,” and anyone who 
wanted to attend could do so. DUMAC advertised these 
presentations in the campus newspaper. As the 
interviewee observed, “a university environment is not 
a good place to have people perceive that you’re being 
secretive.” While DUMAC offices were physically 
separate from the core campus (located in a bank 
building rather than on Duke University grounds), 
DUMAC still considered itself to be part of the 
university community, ready to respond to questions. 
Professionalization of the back office 
Before it became a more widespread investment 
management practice, DUMAC reduced the amount of some 
of the redundant clerical work done, instead moving 
towards more broad-based controls, according to the 
interviewee. DUMAC transitioned to using the title of 
Performance Analyst for personnel that might be 
considered clerical workers in other investment 
management organizations. According to the 
interviewee, visitors at DUMAC were initially shocked 
to discover the kinds of things DUMAC chose not to do, 
especially with regard to auditing trades and 
monitoring various other custodian bank activities. 
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The interviewee typically posed the question to those 
visitors, “What did you catch in your own auditing of 
trades and custodian bank activities, that didn’t get 
caught by someone else--and what did it cost you to 
catch that error?” As the interviewee noted, this was 
a way of creating more effective controls by focusing 
on results rather than on clerical details. The 
interviewee observed that the MCI/WorldCom financial 
scandal of 2001-2002 was particularly surprising, and 
wondered how MCI/WorldCom could have been doing “all 
kinds of expansion” while reporting such a low cost 
structure. The interviewee suggested that the mere 
appearance of balanced books was not an indication 
that all was well. Likewise, a clerical focus in the 
investment management world might give one a false 
sense of confidence and accomplishment. As the 
interviewee observed, “Why pay a custodian bank to 
fulfill a fiduciary duty if you’re going to check 
every dividend and interest collection behind them? 
They have whole departments whose job it is to do 
that.” Instead, the role of the back office at DUMAC, 
at the time of the interview, was to assess whether 
the custodian bank was doing that job effectively, and 
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it was the intention of DUMAC employees to make the 
assessment and oversight function as cost-effective as 
possible. 
DUMAC’s external fund managers were contractually 
obligated to reconcile with the custodian. Instead of 
reconciling with the custodian bank once a month, 
DUMAC reconciled independently once a year. In doing 
such reconciliation less frequently, they enabled a 
full-time employee to help with more analytical and 
professional work. Instead of redundant keypunching, 
DUMAC focused on value-added analysis, according to 
the interviewee. While it was detailed work, it was 
not clerical in nature—it was really a form of quality 
control, according to the interviewee. 
The DUMAC board shifted the mandate for DUMAC 
with respect to front office functions, according to 
the interviewee. They eliminated the trading room, and 
narrowed DUMAC’s responsibilities over time. Any time 
an external entity could perform a function more 
efficiently or less expensively than DUMAC, that 
responsibility was outsourced. DUMAC expanded or 
contracted various components of the staff since its 
initial formation, but kept within 2-3 of its original 
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headcount. DUMAC had 23 employees at the time of the 
interview. 
DUMAC’s administrative costs were calculated in 
basis points, or one-hundredths of a percent. When 
originally formed, that cost was high, considering 
that assets under management were around $1 billion. 
DUMAC leaders planned at the outset to move into more 
alternative investments and venture capital, which 
carry higher administrative costs relative to other 
asset classes. The interviewee conceded that DUMAC was 
more expensive to run than if they had simply hired 
external consultants (instead of forming DUMAC), but 
such consultants would have come with their own 
constraints, requiring high-capacity tasks that could 
be spread across all their clients. 
Choosing the right custodian bank 
The interviewee noted that the custodian bank 
function became significantly more important in the 
early 1990’s, with the advent of electronic trading 
and the reduction of transaction settlement time. With 
that reduction, back office errors became more costly, 
and the choice of the right custodian bank increased 
in importance. Custodian banks converted from 
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quarterly to daily record keeping systems, and there 
was a huge consolidation in the banking industry. The 
interviewee observed that custodian banks were not 
necessarily either good or bad, but they might be good 
or bad for particular tasks or functions. They had 
their own particular areas of expertise and their own 
strengths and weaknesses which had to be appraised in 
light of the needs and characteristics of the 
institution’s endowment. 
Formation of a solid ethics policy: staff member 
portfolio policy 
The interviewee said that DUMAC’s founders 
wrestled with how to create a solid ethics policy, and 
a “light of day” approach proved to be a helpful 
mechanism. The cleanest ethics policy might limit 
employees in what they could do with their own 
portfolios, but staff members also had to be able to 
apply their own investment management expertise to 
their personal portfolios. 
At the time of the interview, DUMAC had a 
conflict of interest policy limiting the ability of 
employees to trade. For example, day trading was 
prohibited. There were also limits on the ability of 
staff members to co-invest with DUMAC. Such co-
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investment required prior approval, and though the 
ethics policy did not mention it explicitly, staff 
members could not in practice receive a better 
investment deal than the University had negotiated for 
the same investment. (In the world of private capital, 
such investments were referred to as “friends and 
family” money, which might allow for a reduction or 
elimination of investment fees. DUMAC did not allow 
such special treatment for staffers at the time of the 
interview.)  
The ethics policy prohibited the staff from 
accepting gifts. Outside work and relationships 
(whether paid or unpaid) had the potential for 
creating conflicts of interest. The ethics policy 
required that such arrangements receive prior approval 
from the president of DUMAC. 
DUMAC had standardized the overall method of 
requesting approval of employee portfolio investments 
over the last few years, according to the interviewee. 
There was a set of guidelines which communicated the 
types of investments which were likely to be approved. 
For example, one such guideline had the effect of 
discouraging proposed investments that were 
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disproportionately large relative to the staff 
member’s net worth.  
Finally, there was the requirement that staff 
members sign a quarterly statement that they did not 
have any conflicts of interest. In addition, staff 
members had to account for all non-mutual fund trading 
for each quarter. In summary, staff members had to 
disclose their trades, and they had to get prior 
approval to conduct business with an entity that had a 
pre-existing business relationship with the 
University.  
Formation of a solid ethics policy: endowment 
portfolio policy 
Ethical considerations extended beyond the 
portfolios of individual employees; DUMAC’s ethics 
policy also addressed investment rules for the 
endowment portfolio itself. The policy specified that 
DUMAC staffers had no authority to invest the 
endowment in any other way than to maximize investment 
return. In other words, any constraints would have to 
come from the Duke University Board of Trustees, since 
they were the fiduciaries. When DUMAC was first 
created, its investment portfolio was free of 
investments in South Africa, by mandate from the Duke 
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University Board of Trustees. Trustees later removed 
that specific constraint in response to the changing 
political situation in that country.  
Duke University Trustees might “sub-optimize” 
some investments by taking them out of the endowment 
proper, according to the interviewee, but DUMAC staff 
members could not make such decisions on their own. 
For example, there was at one time a desire on the 
part of Duke University Trustees to invest in North 
Carolina venture capital funds. Whereas DUMAC’s 
standing in the investment world permitted investment 
in top-tier venture capital funds, it was somewhat 
difficult for firms in North Carolina to be considered 
top-tier, according to the interviewee. Trustees 
desired to target some investments regionally, so some 
funds were moved from the quasi-endowment pool and 
invested in North Carolina-based venture capital. 
Whatever the Trustees’ mandate, it was the 
responsibility of DUMAC to obtain the best results 
possible within those constraints, according to the 
interviewee. 
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Internal versus external fund management 
At the time of the interview, DUMAC used external 
fund managers and did not manage any funds internally, 
performing no individual security selection. DUMAC’s 
staff did not consist of investment managers; rather, 
it employed internal risk managers. DUMAC entered into 
specific security selection only in extraordinary 
cases of over-arching rebalancing among asset classes, 
according to the interviewee. The internal managers 
did not pick stocks or fixed income instruments. 
(DUMAC did pick fixed income instruments in the first 
three years after DUMAC’s founding, but at the time of 
the interview, the practice had been discontinued.) 
On the other hand, the interviewee conceded that 
if DUMAC were larger, they might have done some of the 
non-active investment management functions internally 
(i.e. indexed investments by asset class). Part of 
that rationale was a function of the size of assets 
under management, and part of it was a function of the 
investment philosophy at DUMAC. The interviewee 
characterized DUMAC’s approach to fixed income 
instruments as passive, external indexing. But he 
suggested that if there were a large enough pool of 
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fixed income at DUMAC, they might have considered 
internal management, provided that there was 
sufficient internal staff for the task and that it 
could be done in a cost-effective way.  
UMIFA and the impact on Duke / DUMAC 
UMIFA was passed in 1985 in North Carolina. Prior 
to that time, most endowments were invested for yield 
rather than for total return, because the definition 
of principal did not permit investment on a total 
return basis. In 1984-85, the DUMAC endowment spending 
rate was in the neighborhood of 8.5-9%, and that 
comparatively high rate was beginning to have a 
serious impact on the long-term purchasing power of 
the endowment. Spending the interest and dividends did 
not take inflation into account, and the endowment 
purchasing power was actually decreasing. In 1985, in 
the wake of UMIFA, Duke began moving towards the total 
return model, and towards including more alternative 
investments in its portfolio.  
HARVARD MANAGEMENT COMPANY (HMC) 
The interview at Harvard Management Company 
(HMC), conducted in September 2002, focused on (1) the 
individual interviewee’s background, (2) a brief 
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history of HMC, (3) the HMC Board of Directors, 
structure and staff, (4) external management and 
spinoffs, (5) spending policy, (6) interaction between 
Harvard University’s Planned Giving Department and 
HMC’s Trusts & Gifts Department, (7) the HMC policy 
portfolio, and (8) the ethics policy at HMC. 
Interviewee’s background 
The interviewee had been working at HMC between 
two and five years at the time of the interview, with 
a career spent entirely in investment management, 
spanning roughly four decades. This individual had 
significant experience dealing with complex endowment 
funds. 
Brief history of HMC 
HMC was founded in 1974, the first company of its 
kind founded by a university in the United States. 
Prior to the formation of HMC, Harvard University used 
State Street Management and Research in Boston to 
manage its endowment. At the time, the Treasurer of 
Harvard was also a principal at State Street, and the 
firm managed Harvard University’s entire endowment. In 
1974, the Treasurer retired from Harvard University. 
Upon retirement, the Treasurer recommended the 
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formation of Harvard Management Company, given the 
fact that markets were getting increasingly 
complicated, and given that there were more and more 
asset classes in which to invest.   
According to the interviewee, the Treasurer 
believed that a separate management company dedicated 
to Harvard University as its sole client would enable 
it to take full advantage of whatever asset classes it 
chose to invest in, and he believed it could be better 
done by an internal management company rather than one 
completely separate from the University like State 
Street. The creation and founding of HMC thus had to 
do with increasingly complicated markets, more asset 
classes, and finding one firm to do everything, such 
that Harvard’s interests would come first.  
HMC Board of Directors, structure, and staff 
At the time of the interview, HMC was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Harvard University. The HMC Board 
of Directors was appointed by the “President and 
Fellows of Harvard”—a term of corporate governance at 
Harvard dating back to the original charter in 1636. 
The Chairman of the Board was also the Treasurer of 
the University. The 12 other members of the HMC Board 
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of Directors included the President of Harvard, as 
well as faculty, alumni, and other administrators of 
the university. Board meetings were held quarterly, 
typically a full day with a morning session of several 
hours. After his portion of the meeting, the Chairman 
of the HMC Board would turn the meeting over to HMC’s 
Chief Executive Officer. The CEO basically reviewed 
what was happening with the endowment and often 
brought three or four of the HMC portfolio managers to 
make presentations on what they were doing. There were 
discussions about risk and reward and about the status 
of the policy portfolio. The afternoon portion of the 
meeting was primarily concerned with more long-range 
thinking. 
Jack Meyer had led HMC since 1990. Meyer came 
from a background in the investment business; he was 
the Chief Investment Officer of the Rockefeller 
Foundation in New York prior to joining HMC. He was a 
graduate of the Harvard School of Business, and his 
approach to investment management was highly 
quantitative and analytical, grounded thoroughly in 
portfolio theory, according to the interviewee. When 
Meyer arrived, he had to devise an investment 
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strategy, and he did this through the creation of the 
Policy Portfolio (explained in more detail below).  
HMC managed endowment funds, pension assets, a 
working capital fund, and planned gifts, at the time 
of the interview. The entire HMC staff consisted of 
170-180 internal employees. Between 50% and 60% of the 
overall endowment was managed internally, according to 
the interviewee; the remainder was managed outside of 
HMC. Groups within HMC, as small as a few people or as 
large as seven to eight people, were charged with 
managing individual asset classes to beat internally 
established benchmarks. 
Tobacco stocks were the sole type of stock that 
HMC was prohibited from holding at the time of the 
interview. There had been a prohibition on holding 
stocks for companies based in South Africa, but that 
prohibition ended several years prior to the 
interview. 
Offices for HMC were physically separate from the 
the University campus at the time of the interview, 
but in general there was a feeling of close 
association, according to the interviewee. On the HMC 
Board of Directors, there was always representation by 
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at least one key person from the administration of 
Harvard University—e.g., a vice president of finance.  
External management and spinoffs 
Several of the external management firms that HMC 
dealt with at the time of the interview were initially 
formed at HMC; over the course of the six years prior 
to the interview, they had been permitted by HMC to 
spin off as independent firms. Those spin-offs 
included (a) Charlesbank, (b) Adage Capital, (c) a 
high-yield bond manager, and (d) an absolute return 
manager. 
The principal rationale for the spin-offs was to 
allow those firms to manage more money and thereby to 
enhance their own net worth, according to the 
interviewee. HMC gave these firms substantial assets 
to manage, so they were still very important to HMC, 
and HMC was still very important to them. Prior to the 
formation of those spin-off companies, HMC was 
investing 75% of its own assets internally, according 
to the interviewee. The primary exceptions to internal 
fund management (prior to the spin-offs) consisted of 
(a) private equity and (b) real estate, both in the 
form of outside partnerships. The interviewee noted 
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that HMC had relationships with a few other outside 
firms prior to the four major spinoffs, but private 
equity and real estate were the primary examples. 
Combined internal and external management existed 
for some asset classes at HMC at the time of the 
interview. For domestic equities, for example, there 
was both internal and external fund management. Prior 
to the spinoff of Adage Capital in Summer 2001, the 
bulk of the equities were managed internally. 
According to the interviewee, Adage Capital was “far 
and away the largest manager of [HMC’s] domestic/U.S. 
equities” at the time of the study. But they made no 
bets on a “growth relative to value” style, and they 
made no bets relative to specific industries. Their 
entire portfolio was indexed to the S&P 900, except 
for tobacco stocks, which were prohibited by HMC. They 
tried to pick individual stocks within each industry 
category. They were allowed to go long and short; 
i.e., they ran their portfolio as a hedge fund. They 
utilized their expertise in picking those stocks 
within each industry category that were attractive 
relative to others. They built a portfolio on that 
basis, and they did very well, according to the 
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interviewee. Every year, they outperformed the S&P 
900, without exception, which the interviewee observed 
was rather remarkable. That is why they chose to spin 
themselves out. They did not, however, give HMC 
exposure to certain asset classes within the domestic 
equities market, such as very small-cap stocks—“mini” 
caps, that HMC’s Board felt were important. In order 
to augment their exposure to domestic equities, HMC 
hired additional external firms, according to the 
interviewee. 
The appropriate size of the spin-off companies 
was addressed on a case-by-case basis. To take one 
example offered by the interviewee, the absolute 
return manager (whom the interviewee noted had 
performed superbly) discussed with HMC a certain limit 
on the assets in this class that might be managed. 
Beyond that limit, the flexibility and liquidity of 
the assets would become too restricted. According to 
the interviewee, those were the sorts of topics 
discussed with all fund managers: “What is your target 
for assets that you would like to have under 
management? How do you intend to reach that target? 
What are your considerations in terms of how large HMC 
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should be as a part of your overall assets under 
management?” 
In every asset class, there was a certain problem 
with size, according to the interviewee. Domestic 
large-cap equities had the fewest problems, but even 
in that asset class, one could encounter problems with 
larger trades. Holding, buying, or selling as many as 
25 million shares, even of a company with a market 
capitalization like that of General Electric, 
presented certain difficulties: trades that large 
could have a dramatic impact on the overall market. 
Asset liquidity was also a factor. Wide variations 
exist in size and liquidity across asset classes. HMC 
spent quite a bit of time thinking about and 
discussing asset size and liquidity with outside 
managers, but the interviewee said there had not been 
a case of sharp disagreement regarding how large 
outside managers should become. 
Charlesbank did a substantial amount of HMC’s 
private investments at the time of the interview, but 
not all of them. HMC invested in other outside 
partnerships, especially in venture capital. 
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Spending policy 
The spending rate for the endowment was set each 
year by the President and Fellows of Harvard 
University; it was done upon discussion with HMC, but 
the President and Fellows retained the final 
authority. The spending rate was typically set within 
a range of 4-5% of the endowment principal value, 
according to the interviewee. In the 1970’s, the 
spending rate climbed above 5% because of the history 
of very poor returns during that decade. A few years 
prior to the interview, it dipped temporarily below 
4%, because of the extraordinarily good returns. 
In contrast with many universities that had 
stricter spending rules, such as 5% of a trailing 12 
month average, Harvard (and M.I.T., the interviewee 
noted) set its spending rate each year within the 4-5% 
range. This approach took into consideration the fact 
that returns vary widely over time, whereas overall 
budgets tend to change much less often, according to 
the interviewee. The interviewee also observed that 
flexibility in the spending policy was more 
appropriate than an arbitrary or fixed policy. 
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Interaction between Harvard University’s Planned 
Giving Department and HMC’s Trusts & Gifts Department 
At the time of the interview, the Trusts & Gifts 
Department at HMC had approximately 17-18 staff 
members with two primary responsibilities. They (a) 
processed, valued, and disposed of any non-cash gifts 
that came to the university, and (b) administered and 
invested all the planned gifts to the university 
(e.g., charitable remainder trusts, charitable lead 
trusts, pooled income funds, and gift annuities). 
Somewhat over $900 million existed in the planned gift 
category at the time of the interview.  
The Department had its own Advisory Board which 
met three times each year, including members of the 
Planned Giving Office, the Development Office, and 
other university administrators. There was constant 
communication between HMC’s Trusts & Gifts Department 
and the University’s Planned Giving staff, and the 
Vice President of Trusts & Gifts at HMC made regular 
presentations to groups of alumni and current 
students, according to the interviewee. Proposed 
planned gifts could not be accepted by the University 
until HMC approved them.  
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HMC’s Trusts & Gifts department had established 
its own rate schedule for gift annuities. HMC’s table 
was slightly less generous than that of the American 
Council on Gift Annuities (ACGA), because HMC 
conducted its own independent study in the early- to 
mid-1990’s, and, about a year prior to the interview, 
reaffirmed the findings of that study. According to 
the interviewee HMC determined its rates based on the 
following:  
first, HMC assumed a long term rate of return 
from the endowment of 9%, and second, there was a 
requirement that if the actual return was up to 2 
standard deviations under the assumed rate, there 
must still be something left for Harvard upon the 
death of the annuitant. 
The difference between the two rate schedules was 
not dramatic, but, as mentioned, HMC’s rates were 
slightly lower than ACGA’s. The applicable rate 
schedule depended on the age of the prospective donor. 
HMC had minimum values for the size of separately 
managed trusts, and retained the authority to grant 
exceptions to the guidelines. The decision of HMC was 
final, according to the interviewee.  
Another function of HMC’s Trusts & Gifts 
Department at the time of the interview was the 
processing, valuation, and disposal of all non-cash 
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gifts (e.g., stocks, real estate, works of art, etc.). 
The Department had to decide whether there was 
sufficient charitable intent, and it retained the 
authority to decline proffered gifts. Harvard 
representatives used a rather detailed Gift Policy 
Manual written in agreement with HMC standards, and 
development officers of the various schools and 
colleges applied those guidelines, such as the minimum 
size of an endowed professorship. 
Policy portfolio 
HMC CEO Jack Meyer created the Policy Portfolio 
soon after his arrival in 1991. At the time of the 
interview, it consisted of 12 asset classes, and the 
performance of each asset was measured against a 
benchmark. The HMC Board of Directors approved each 
benchmark after thorough discussion. Some were 
difficult to establish, because the Policy Portfolio 
included some asset classes that did not have readily 
identifiable benchmarks. The policy portfolio changed 
over time, according to the interviewee, as 
necessitated by the evolution of new asset classes 
such as inflation-indexed bonds. 
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One unusual aspect of the Policy Portfolio was 
the negative allocation to cash (-5% at the time of 
the interview), which reflected explicit leveraging. 
Harvard had a “AAA” bond rating at the time of the 
interview, so it could borrow money at a very 
inexpensive rate. This leveraging strategy was based 
on the belief that, over the long term, an estimate of 
approximately 9% should be utilized as the rate of 
return for the endowment fund. A further assumption 
was that borrowing would be substantially cheaper than 
that 9% rate. The interviewee said that borrowing was, 
however, very risky, so the analysis with respect to 
leveraging cash was “very detailed and analytical.” 
Some of the asset classes in the Policy Portfolio 
could be leveraged, according to the interviewee. 
Domestic bonds was the primary asset class which was 
leveraged at the time of the interview. According to 
the interviewee, HMC chose not to make interest rate 
bets in the bond market as a matter of investment 
philosophy; what HMC tried to do was capitalize on 
what they believed to be asset mispricings between 
individual domestic bonds: for example, one government 
bond relative to another. Since some of the asset 
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prices were not that far apart, the size of the trades 
in those assets had to be considerable, given the 
overall size of HMC’s endowment. Because the assets 
being traded were either extremely high quality, 
highly liquid government bonds or corporate bonds, HMC 
believed that there was relatively little risk 
associated with the trading positions taken in the 
bond market. Counterparty risk (see Appendix B) was 
very carefully assessed at all times. The interviewee 
said that there was a very long list of counterparties 
that HMC dealt with, with very strict limits as to how 
much exposure there could be to each. Those exposures 
were reviewed at least every quarter, and even more 
often, if the CEO or the members of the bond 
department felt that something in the market had 
changed dramatically.  
In sum, HMC believed there were very strict 
controls involved to manage its exposure. There was a 
much smaller amount of leverage that could be used in 
other asset classes, according to the interviewee. 
There was some equity leverage, but in comparison that 




At the time of the interview, HMC had a strict 
code of ethics. It also sought to understand the 
ethics policies of its external managers. Employees of 
HMC trading for their own account had to get prior 
approval for the trade and had to instruct the broker 
to send a duplicate copy of the trade statement 
directly to HMC’s compliance department. For equity 
trades, employees had to notify HMC’s equity desk of 
each impending trade. HMC kept complete records of all 
employee trades, according to the interviewee. 
The Board of Directors reviewed any case where 
there was the “slightest hint of a conflict of 
interest,” according to the interviewee. HMC permitted 
some of its private equity managers to serve on some 
boards of directors of companies in which it had an 
interest. Such situations were reviewed at least 
annually, and they were made public and approved by 
the HMC Board of Directors. 
At the time of the interview, there was a small 
list of stocks in which employees were forbidden to 
trade, because HMC owned either a controlling interest 
or a large minority interest. Those cases were 
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typically very small companies that might have spun 
out of a venture capital company.  
SUMMARY 
The four background interviews on the OAM/UTIMCO 
transition helped to explain some of the factors 
leading to the formation of UTIMCO in 1996. The three 
primary interviews on UTIMCO, DUMAC, and HMC revealed 
considerable variation in the degree of internal 
versus external fund management and the internal scope 
and structure of the three entities. Interviewees 
addressed all of the research questions in this study 
to some degree, including the establishment of 
spending and ethics policies, and the role of 
portfolio composition in driving endowment returns. 
The following chapter outlines the major conclusions 
of the study and suggests several areas for further 
research. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and directions for 
future research 
CONCLUSIONS 
This research project set out to determine how 
the endowment management structures and systems of 
UTIMCO, DUMAC, and HMC differed, and to determine why 
UTIMCO was formed in 1996. Several themes emerged from 
the seven interviews conducted with investment 
managers and educational administrators. 
In deciding whether to create a separate 
endowment management entity, the following should be 
kept in mind: professionalization of the oversight 
board; regular and formal channels of communication; 
the advantages of in-house versus outsourced fund 
management; professionalization of the back office; 
the formation of spin-off companies; the extent to 
which the labor market for the recruitment and 
retention of professional staff is local, regional, or 
national (and the extent to which the working 
environment might mitigate the risk of paying lower 
than market salaries); formation of a solid ethics 
policy; and creation of a separate endowment 
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management entity to further the goals of the fund. 
The academic literature on investment management 
foreshadowed the author’s direct experience with these 
topics, and these were the themes that emerged most 
clearly from this study. The following sections will 
explain the degree to which each theme was influenced 
by the interviews conducted at each entity. 
Professionalization of the oversight board 
In the case of the University of Texas System, a 
lack of investment experience and investment expertise 
in the oversight board was one of the primary reasons 
interviewees offered for creating a separate 
investment management company with its own separate 
oversight board. The goal was to create a board 
dominated by investment professionals. Prior to the 
formation of UTIMCO as a separate 501(c)(3) company, 
the previous internal endowment management entity (the 
Office of Asset Management) formed an Investment 
Advisory Council to strengthen its credibility with an 
oversight board that was at the time dominated more by 
individuals successful in business and in leadership 
than in investment management. 
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The DUMAC interview revealed a similar motivation 
at Duke University in 1989 to create a separate 
investment management entity with its own board 
dominated by investment management professionals. 
Perhaps because the founding of HMC occurred nearly 
three decades prior to the present study, either this 
was not a compelling reason, or that rationale was not 
preserved as part of HMC’s institutional memory. 
Instead, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the  
creation and founding of HMC had more to do with 
increasingly complex markets, more and more asset 
classes, and creating one firm to keep Harvard 
University’s interests first. 
Regular and formal channels of communication 
All interviewees stressed the importance of 
maintaining regular and formal channels of 
communication with campus development officers in 
particular and with other constituents in general.  
DUMAC and UTIMCO both relied heavily on Web-based 
reporting to communicate with benefactors and to relay 
information about endowment performance to various 
constituents. In the case of UTIMCO, there was a 
fairly substantial Web-based application used to 
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disseminate endowment reports to the component 
institutions of the University of Texas System spread 
across the state. HMC relied on more traditional means 
of communication, including individualized letters to 
“friends of Harvard” and various constituents. 
Interviewees at both HMC and DUMAC emphasized their 
fairly regular presentations to members of their 
campus communities; such face-to-face meetings are 
easier to conduct when a management company serves one 
main campus rather than several, as in the case of 
UTIMCO. 
Managing funds internally versus externally 
With 23 employees, DUMAC conducted only risk 
management (and not individual security selection) in-
house, choosing to use external fund managers for all 
specific security selection. HMC was at the opposite 
end of the spectrum, with 170 employees managing 50-
60% of its assets internally. UTIMCO outsourced 90% of 
its fund management and had 31 employees. The primary 
considerations indicated by interviewees regarding 
internal versus external management were the size of 
assets under management and the likelihood of 
achieving superior investment returns. The raw cost of 
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internal versus external management was not the 
overarching consideration. 
Professionalization of the back office 
DUMAC in particular highlighted the increasingly 
professional nature of the work done by the back 
office staff, and the amount of clerical work done 
there had been reduced in the interest of efficiency. 
The focus at DUMAC was on effective controls and on 
confirming that the custodian bank fulfilled its 
fiduciary duties.  
This theme of professionalizing the back office 
did not arise in the interviews at UTIMCO or at HMC. 
One might speculate that UTIMCO management would be 
less likely to reduce the amount of detailed auditing 
work done, at least in part due to the intense public 
scrutiny and political pressure faced by an entity 
entrusted with public funds. On the other hand, given 
UTIMCO’s ready acceptance of the role of educating its 
constituents (citizens, legislators, and the campus 
communities) about investment management practices, 
its leaders could make a convincing case that greater 
efficiency and more effective controls need not 
require current levels of clerical effort.  
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HMC might be in a better position to streamline 
such back office functions, given the significantly 
larger scale of its internal operations and its larger 
staff. As with UTIMCO, though, this theme did not 
emerge in the course of the interview at HMC, and the 
author did not raise the topic. 
Deciding whether to allow the formation of spin-off 
companies 
HMC permitted the formation of four substantial 
investment management companies, and was the only one 
of the three entities studied that allowed such spin-
offs to occur. Perhaps due to the size of its 
endowment and its institutional maturity, HMC was able 
to attract several of the best fund managers in the 
country; HMC leaders chose to allow spin-offs in 
certain circumstances, perhaps in order to maintain a 
mutually rewarding relationship with those fund 
managers.  
The UTIMCO interviews pointed out that the low 
potential for fund managers to create their own spin-
offs was a limiting factor in fund manager 
recruitment. In addition, it was unlikely that the 
general UTIMCO policy tradition of discouraging spin-
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offs would ease, given the political climate in which 
UTIMCO operated. 
Staff recruitment and retention 
One of the reasons given for the formation of 
UTIMCO was that it would aid in the recruitment and 
retention of the professional staff for there to be a 
degree of separation from the university campus. 
Interviewees argued that, for the most part, 
investment professionals aspire to work in financial 
settings.  
Several interviewees pointed out that each 
investment management company needs to determine the 
extent to which its recruitment and retention of 
professional staff should be directed at the local, 
regional, or national labor markets. Further, they 
must consider the extent to which the working 
environment (city, state, and “quality of life” 
concerns) might mitigate the risk of paying lower 
salaries than market forces might otherwise dictate.  
Each of the three investment management companies 
maintained office space in bank buildings rather than 
on the main university campus. This separation could 
be driven by space constraints on campus, but most 
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interviewees suggested that it was a conscious choice 
made to help attract more qualified managers.  
Formation of a solid ethics policy: staff portfolios 
and endowment portfolios 
There seemed to be a particularly high ethical 
standard set for each of the management companies 
studied. There was considerable scrutiny on UTIMCO 
given that the endowment it managed benefited state 
university systems. Just prior to this study, there 
were ethics-related policy changes, including a 
decision to require disclosure of certain private 
investments at UTIMCO as a result of the heightened 
scrutiny of public endowment management in Texas. 
At the time of the interviews, the primary 
endowment funds at DUMAC and UTIMCO were invested with 
the sole goal of maximizing return on investment. HMC 
had a prohibition against investing in tobacco-related 
securities, but with that single exception, followed 
that same model. In all three cases, the investment 
management entity had strict controls over employee 
trading and employee portfolios to minimize the 
possibility of apparent and actual conflicts of 
interest. 
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The UTIMCO interviews in particular called 
attention to the ethical implications of designing a 
stable spending policy and providing a steady revenue 
stream for current and future generations of students. 
Guaranteeing some kind of intergenerational justice by 
assuring that proceeds from the endowment would 
continue forever is not typically thought of as part 
of the ethics policy, but the argument was made that 
it should be thought of as such. Spending policy has 
an enormous impact on the long-term health of the 
endowment, and ill-considered decisions can adversely 
impact future generations. (The scholarly literature 
written in response to John Rawls’s seminal work A 
Theory of Justice provides a good analytical framework 
for such considerations of intergenerational justice.)  
Swensen (2000) led to the author to believe that, 
given the infinite time horizon of educational 
endowments, it is unethical to invest with only 
minimal risk. Such an approach would necessarily cause 
depreciation of the principal over time, thereby 
eroding the endowment’s purchasing power. One might 
also argue that educational endowments should be among 
the riskiest funds in overall outlook, though that 
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could only be possible in combination with significant 
insulation of the spending policy from political and 
other transient forces. 
Whether to create a separate investment management 
entity 
The HMC interviewee observed that one of the 
reasons Harvard University created HMC was because it 
wanted to ensure that Harvard was the sole customer of 
its endowment management entity. HMC had departed 
somewhat from that original vision by permitting the 
formation of four spin-off companies, but as indicated 
by the HMC interview, relationships with those 
external managers were carefully monitored, and HMC 
retained oversight responsibilities for all such 
activities on behalf of Harvard alone. 
The original vision for UTIMCO was that a 
separate investment management entity might be able to 
avoid some of the open records requests that 
distracted the Office of Asset Management (OAM) staff. 
That has not been the case. Another reason offered for 
formation of UTIMCO was that it needed a Board 
dominated by investment management professionals. It 
had such a Board at the time of the interview, but it 
is reasonable to speculate whether the UT System Board 
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of Regents could have granted the forerunner of the 
UTIMCO Board--the Investment Advisory Committee, 
created during the OAM days—-more responsibility and 
authority for overseeing the work of the OAM. That 
would have obviated the need for the formation of a 
separate company.  
Given that the formation of UTIMCO has already 
taken place, however, it does not seem likely that the 
endowment management function will be reintegrated 
within the UT System. Such considerations of 
empowering the oversight board and staffing it with 
investment professionals might, however, give pause to 
leaders of other public university systems who might 
be considering the creation of their own separate 
investment management entities.  
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several possibilities for future study 
implied by this work. A researcher might: (a) compare 
a large public university having a separate endowment 
management entity with a large public university which 
integrates its endowment management function within 
its administrative structure; (b) conduct additional, 
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in-depth interviews covering all organizational levels 
at one management entity; or (c) focus solely on 
ethics policy formation at endowment management 
companies. 
Officials at UT System took a bold step in 1996 
by creating the first separate investment management 
entity for a large public university.  Swensen (2000, 
p. 339) has suggested that such a separation is 
counterproductive because of the tendency to treat the 
separate company solely as an investment entity, 
leaving spending policy creation and enforcement to 
others. This is a serious concern, and a comparative 
study between public universities with and without 
separate investment management entities would serve to 
confirm or deny Swensen’s assertion. 
In-depth interviews at a single investment 
management entity would give a more balanced account 
of how well the entity functions at all levels. The 
present study focused on leaders at such investment 
management entities, but it would be worthwhile to 
consider rank-and-file employees as well (from clerks 
to fund managers), to get a better sense of the 
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working environment and the relationships between 
stated institutional goals and actual practices. 
Ethics policy creation, maintenance, and 
enforcement is a particularly interesting and 
compelling subset of the structural issues facing 
investment management entities, particularly those 
serving public institutions due to the increased 
public scrutiny they enjoy. A wider study focusing on 
ethics policies at several large endowment management 
entities might lead to a “best of breed” approach to 
ethics policy formation. Founders of UTIMCO charged 
their advisors with conducting such a study, but it 
would help to explore even more of the variety found 
in ethics policies across the country. 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
At this writing, given the mid-2003 economic and 
political turmoil (with an enduring bear market and 
states cutting funding to public institutions of 
higher education), endowment management effectiveness 
is more important than ever. Colleges and universities 
have only a few potential revenue streams, from 
tuition and fees to new donor gifts and auxiliary 
enterprises. The gaps between endowments for the top 
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public and private institutions are wide: Harvard 
University had $907,301 endowment dollars per student, 
while UT System had just $72,566 per student in 2002 
(Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac 2003-2004, 
August 29, 2003, p. 27).  
Moreover, Harvard’s endowment payout met 32% of 
annual operating expenses, while UT System’s endowment 
payout met less than 8% of operating expenses in 2002 
(Harvard University, 2002, p. 11; UT System, October 
2003, p. 1). Educational administrators should look to 
major endowment management entities with a view to 
maximizing their effectiveness and the contributions 
they can make to the educational enterprise. Their 
constituents (students, faculty, donors, and others) 
will expect only the best in their stewardship of 
endowment funds for centuries to come. 
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Appendix A: Categories of Endowments and 
Similar Funds 
There are three principal categories of 
endowments and similar funds, according to Greene 
(1992): 
 
1) Endowment funds (sometimes referred to as 
“true endowment” funds) are funds received from a 
donor with the restriction that the principal is not 
expendable. 
2) Term endowment funds are funds for which the 
donor stipulates that the principal may be expended 
after a stated period or upon the occurrence of a 
certain event. 
3) Funds functioning as endowment (sometimes 
referred to as “quasi-endowment” funds) are funds that 
are established by the governing board to function 
like an endowment fund but which may be expended at 
any time or at the discretion of the governing board. 
 There is another category of funds worth 
mentioning: annuity and life income funds, which 
represent gifts or bequests subject to payment of 
income or specified amounts to one or more 
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beneficiaries for life. These are not institutional 
funds as defined by the Uniform Management of 
Institutional Funds Act, but they become such on the 
death of the last beneficiary if they are restricted 
for endowment purposes. 
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Appendix B: Glossary 
The following definitions, deemed to be the most 
relevant to educational endowment management, are 
included as a general guide. They have been extracted 
primarily from Downes (1998) and Shook & Shook (1990). 
In cases where a concise definition was unavailable, 
sections from Swensen (2000) and others are included. 
 
Absolute Return Investing: “First identified as a 
distinct asset class by Yale University in 1990… 
[it is] dedicated to exploiting inefficiencies in 
pricing marketable securities” (Swensen, 1990, p. 
114). Event-driven techniques include merger 
arbitrage and distressed security investing; 
value-driven techniques “employ off-setting long 
and short positions to eliminate market 
exposure.” Such investments have a relatively 
short time horizon, from several months to two 
years (Swensen, 1990, p. 114). 
Alternative investments / alternative asset class: 
Anson (2002) differs with Swensen (2000) and 
others on this definition. According to Anson, 
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“In most cases, alternative assets are a subset 
of an existing asset class. This may run contrary 
to the popular view [i.e. the view of Swensen and 
others] that what many consider separate 
‘classes’ are really just different investment 
strategies within an existing asset class” 
(Anson, 2002, p. 1). “Specifically, most 
alternative assets derive their value from either 
the debt or equity markets” (Anson, 2002, p. 1). 
“… We classify five types of alternative assets: 
hedge funds, commodity and managed futures, 
private equity, credit derivatives, and corporate 
governance” (Anson, 2002, p. 1). See also Jaeger 
(2002), pp. 17-37. Interviewees in the present 
study did not use this terminology, instead 
referring to more specific asset classes like 
venture capital or hedge funds. 
Amortization: “accounting procedure that gradually 
reduces the cost value of a limited life or 
intangible asset through periodic changes to 
income. For fixed assets the term used is 
depreciation, and for wasting assets (natural 
resources) it is depletion, both terms meaning 
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the same thing as amortization… Amortization also 
refers to the reduction of debt by regular 
payments of interest and principal sufficient to 
pay off a loan by maturity” (Downes, 1998, p. 
23). 
Annuity: “Form of contract sold by life insurance 
companies that guarantees a fixed or variable 
payment to the annuitant at some future time, 
usually retirement” (Downes, 1998, p. 26). 
Appreciation: “increase in the value  of an asset such 
as a stock, bond, commodity, or real estate” 
(Downes, 1998, p. 27). 
Arbitrage: “Profiting from differences in price when 
the same security, currency, or commodity is 
traded on two or more markets” (Downes, 1998, p. 
27). 
Asset allocation: “Apportioning of investment funds 
among categories of assets, such as cash 
equivalents, stock, fixed-income investments, and 
such tangible assets as real estate, precious 
metals, and collectibles. Also applies to 
subcategories such as government, municipal, and 
corporate bonds, and industry groupings of common 
 137
stocks. Asset allocation affects both risk and 
return and is a central concept in personal 
financial planning and investment management” 
(Downes, 1998, p.30). 
Basis point: “smallest measure used in quoting yields 
on bills, notes, and bonds. One basis point is 
.01%, or one one-hundredth of a percent of yield. 
Thus, 100 basis points equal 1%” (Downes, 1998, 
p. 48). 
Bond: “any interest-bearing or discounted government 
or corporate security that obligates the issuer 
to pay the bondholder a specified sum of money, 
usually at specific intervals, and to repay the 
principal amount of the loan at maturity” 
(Downes, 1998, p. 59). 
Bond rating: “method of evaluating the possibility of 
default by a bond issuer... ratings range from 
AAA (highly unlikely to default) to D (in 
default). Bonds rated BB or below are not 
investment grade—in other words, institutions 
that invest other people’s money may not under 
most state laws buy them” (Downes, 1998, p. 62). 
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Book value: “value at which an asset is carried on a 
balance sheet… its book value at any time is its 
cost minus accumulated depreciation…book value 
can be a guide in selecting underpriced stocks 
and is an indication of the ultimate value of 
securities in liquidation” (Downes, 1998, p. 63). 
“[With regard to alternative assets] the value of 
private securities cannot be determined by market 
trading. The value of the private securities must 
be estimated by book value, appraisal, or 
determined by a cash flow model” (Anson, 2002, p. 
7). 
Cash equivalents: “Investments with a high level of 
liquidity” (Shook & Shook, 1990, p. 56). Bruce, 
relying on NACUBO (1997), notes that this 
category could include “Treasury bills, 
commercial paper, certificates of deposit, [and] 
nonconvertible bonds with remaining maturities of 
less than one year” (Bruce, 1999, p. 10). 
Charitable remainder annuity trust: “A trust fund with 
the stipulation that at least 5 percent of the 
initial fair market value of property held in the 
trust is to be distributed annually to a 
 139
noncharitable beneficiary, with the remainder 
going to a charity” (Shook & Shook, 1990, p. 61). 
Charitable remainder trust: “irrevocable trust that 
pays income to one or more individuals until the 
grantor’s death, at which time the balance, which 
is tax free, passes to a designated charity. It 
is a popular tax-saving alternative for 
individuals who have no children or who are 
wealthy enough to benefit both children and 
charity“ (Downes, 1998, p. 91). “The charitable 
remainder trust is the reverse of a charitable 
lead trust, whereby a charity receives income 
during the grantor's life and the remainder 
passes to designated family members upon the 
grantor's death. The latter trust reduces estate 
taxes while enabling the family to retain control 
of the assets” (Downes, 1998, p. 91). 
Common stock: “A unit of ownership in a public company 
for which the holder can vote on matters and 
receive dividends from the company’s growth, but 
he or she is the last to receive assets if the 
company liquidates. It differs from preferred 
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stock in that preferred stock has a set dividend 
rate” (Shook & Shook, 1990, p. 72). 
Cost basis: “The original cost of an asset less 
depreciation” (Shook & Shook, 1990, p. 84). 
Counterparty risk: Hedge fund managers trading in 
over-the-counter derivative instruments are 
engaging in private contracts between the hedge 
fund manager and his/her counterparty. The 
counterparty is often a large Wall Street 
investment house or large money center bank. When 
a hedge fund manager negotiates these custom 
derivative contracts with a counterparty, the 
hedge fund manager takes on the credit risk that 
the counterparty will fulfill his/her obligation 
under the contract (Anson, p. 81). Changes in 
counter-party policies and/or the withdrawal of 
counter-party funding support can cause severe 
losses in alternative investments (Jaeger, p. 
139).  
Derivative: “Short for derivative instrument, a 
contract whose value is based on the performance 
of an underlying financial asset, index, or other 
investment. For example, an ordinary option is a 
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derivative because its value changes in relation 
to the performance of an underlying stock. A more 
complex example would be an option on a futures 
contract, where the option value varies with the 
value of the futures contract which, in turn, 
varies with the value of an underlying commodity 
or security. Derivatives are available based on 
the performance of assets, interest rates, 
currency exchange rates, and various domestic and 
foreign indexes. Derivates afford leverage and, 
when used properly by knowledgeable investors, 
can enhance returns and be useful in hedging 
portfolios“ (Downes, 1998, p. 147). 
Efficient markets: “The U.S. public stock and bond 
markets are generally considered to be the most 
efficient marketplaces in the world… This means 
that all publicly available information regarding 
a publicly traded corporation, both past 
information and present, is fully priced in that 
company’s traded securities” (Anson, 2002, p. 7). 
“In contrast, with respect to alternative assets, 
information is very difficult to acquire” (Anson, 
2002, p. 7). 
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Endowment: “Permanent gift of money or property to a 
specified institution for a specified purpose. 
Endowments may finance physical assets or be 
invested to provide ongoing income to finance 
operations” (Downes, 1998, p. 176). See also 
Appendix A, “Categories of endowments and similar 
funds.” 
Endowment current income: “The sum of stock dividends, 
bond interest, cash equivalent interest, rents, 
royalties, and other net cash flows earned by 
assets held in the endowment over a specific 
period–does not include principal appreciation” 
(Bruce, 1999, p. 11). 
Externally managed assets: “Those assets, including 
pooled assets, managed by individuals or firms 
outside an institution” [or company] (NACUBO, 
1997, as cited in Bruce, 1999, p.11). 
Hedge fund: “Private investment partnership (for U.S. 
investors) or an off-shore investment corporation 
(for non-U.S. or tax-exempt investors) in which 
the general partner has made a substantial 
personal investment, and whose offering 
memorandum allows for the fund to take both long 
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and short positions, use leverage and 
derivatives, and invest in many markets. Hedge 
funds often take large risks on speculative 
strategies, including program trading, selling 
short, swaps, and arbitrage. A fund need not 
employ all of these tools all of the time; it 
must merely have them at its disposal. Since 
hedge funds are not limited to buying securities, 
they can potentially profit in any market 
environment, including one with sharply declining 
prices. Because they move billions of dollars in 
and out of markets quickly, hedge funds can have 
a significant impact on the day-to-day trading 
developments in the stock, bond, and futures 
markets” (Downes, 1998, p. 255). 
Historical dollar value: “The aggregate fair value in 
dollars of the endowment fund at the time it 
became an endowment fund, each subsequent 
donation to the fund at the time it is made, and 
each accumulation made pursuant to a direction in 
the applicable gift instrument at the time it is 
added to the fund” (Daugherty, 1994, as cited by 
Bruce, 1999, p. 11). 
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Internally managed assets: “Those assets managed by 
individuals or committees within an institution” 
[or company] (NACUBO, 1997, as cited in Bruce, 
1999, p.11). 
Investment committee: “The subcommittee of the 
institution’s governing board responsible for 
endowment and other investment management” 
(Daugherty, 1994, as cited by Bruce, 1999, p. 
11). 
Investment pool: “The legal grouping of assets that 
permits a broad diversification of investments 
and economies of administration and accounting” 
(Greene, 1992, as cited by Bruce, 1999, p. 11). 
Large cap: “Stock with a large capitalization (numbers 
of shares outstanding times the price of the 
shares). Large Cap stocks typically have at least 
$5 billion in outstanding market value” (Downes, 
1998, p. 315). 
Liquidity: The degree to which assets can be sold and 
converted rapidly to cash. “Active managers 
pursuing inefficiencies frequently gravitate 
toward relatively illiquid markets… [identifying] 
opportunities to establish positions at 
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meaningful discounts to fair value“ (Swensen, p. 
87). Specific assets or asset classes that might 
be considered highly liquid in smaller quantities 
can become illiquid in very large quantities 
(e.g., one thousand shares of General Electric 
stock versus fifty million shares of the same 
stock). 
Marketable securities: “Stocks, bonds, or notes that 
are traded in various [public] markets” (NACUBO, 
1997, as cited by Bruce, 1999, p. 12). 
Nonmarketable securities: “Investments that are not 
traded in the marketplace (e.g., venture capital, 
leveraged buyouts, and oil and gas). Sometimes 
referred to as alternative investments” (Bruce, 
1999, p. 12). 
Policy Portfolio: A description of the target asset 
mix across asset classes which is intended to 
achieve the desired balance between risk and 
return. 
Price/Earnings ratio: “price of a stock divided by its 
earnings per share… the price/earnings ratio, 
also known as the multiple, gives investors an 
idea of how much they are paying for a company's 
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earning power. The higher the P/E, the more 
investors are paying, and therefore the more 
earnings growth they are expecting” (Downes, 
1998, pp. 465-66). 
Prudent investor rule: replaced the prudent man rule 
in the third restatement of trust law issued by 
the American Law Institute in 1992. It gives 
trustees “more latitude in the exercise of their 
investment responsibility,” addressing risk and 
return, inflation-adjusted real return, and 
investments viewed in total rather than in 
isolation. Underlying the rule is the proposition 
that “no investment vehicles or investment 
management techniques are imprudent per se” 
(Bruce, 1999, pp. 12, 22-23; see also Welch, 
1991, and Harvard College V. Amory, 9 Pick. (26 
Mass.) 446, 461 (1830), as cited in Bruce, 
1999.). It thus allows for a more contextual, 
holistic approach to evaluating the prudence of 
investments. 
Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT): A “company, 
usually traded publicly, that manages a portfolio 
of real estate to earn profits for shareholders. 
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Patterned after investment companies, REITs make 
investments in a diverse array of real estate 
such as shopping centers, medical facilities, 
nursing homes, office buildings, apartment 
complexes, industrial warehouses, and hotels” 
(Downes, 1998, p. 491). 
Settlement date: “Date by which an executed order must 
be settled, either by a buyer paying for the 
securities with cash or by a seller delivering 
the securities and receiving the proceeds of the 
sale for them” (Downes, 1998, p. 560). 
Small cap: “Shorthand for small capitalization stocks 
or mutual funds holding such stocks. Small cap 
stocks usually have a market capitalization 
(number of shares outstanding multiplied by the 
stock price) of $500 million or less. Those under 
$50 million in market cap are known as microcap 
issues” (Downes, 1998, p. 572). 
Spending rate: Amount of endowment income used to pay 
current expenditures. This is usually less than 
total endowment income, since a portion of the 
endowment income may be added back to the 
principal as a hedge against inflation in order 
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to preserve the long-term purchasing power of the 
endowment. 
Survivorship bias: “Occurs when data samples exclude 
markets (or investment funds or individual 
securities) that disappear” (Swensen, 2000, p. 
61n). Such data samples overstate return and 
understate risk (Swensen, 2000, p. 61n). 
“Survivorship bias causes active managers to 
appear stronger as a group“ at times because 
“compilations of return data may include only 
results of managers active at the time of the 
study” (Swensen, 2000, p. 79). 
Total return: The “annual return on an investment 
including appreciation and dividends or interest. 
For bonds held to maturity, total return is yield 
to maturity. For stocks, future appreciation is 
projected using the current price/earnings ratio” 
(Downes, 1998, p. 654). 
UMIFA (Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act): 
provides colleges, universities, and other 
charitable corporations with the total return 
concept, “broad powers of investment authority,” 
“the authority to delegate investment management 
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decisions,” and a method for waiving restrictions 
on the use of endowment funds (NACUBO, 1980, as 
cited in Bruce, 1999). According to Williamson 
(1993), “this legislation authorizes the spending 
of a prudent portion of appreciation in addition 
to what is ordinarily defined as income” (as 
cited in Bruce, 1999, pp. 13-14). 
Yield to Maturity (YTM): a “concept used to determine 
the rate of return an investor will receive if a 
long-term, interest-bearing investment, such as a 
bond, is held to its maturity date. It takes into 
account purchase price, redemption value, time to 
maturity, coupon yield, and the time between 
interest payments” (Downes, 1998, p. 713). 
 150
Appendix C: Interview Protocol 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DIRECTOR/CEO OF SEPARATE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
ENTITY, AND FOR OTHER PERSONS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT EDUCATIONAL 
ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT 
Purpose: To determine current and past endowment 
management practices as supporting research for a 
dissertation in Higher Education Administration being 
completed by Michael J. Craigue at the University of 
Texas at Austin. 
Selection Criteria and Participation: You are 
among 15 or less individuals who have been selected 
for this study on the basis of your knowledge of, and 
experience with, educational endowment management. 
Your participation is entirely voluntary, and your 
response to subsequent inquiries or questions will be  
voluntary. You have the option to answer none, some, 
or all of the questions. You may withdraw from 
participation in this study by choosing not to be 
interviewed. 




Benefits: Benefits of participating in this study 
might include an increase in the understanding of the  
endowment management function and an addition to the 
scholarly literature on this subject. 
Privacy: Your participation in this study is 
considered public to the extent that your comments and  
responses may or may not be included in detailed or 
summary form in the resulting dissertation. If your  
comments and responses are included in the resulting 
dissertation, you will not be identified by name, but  
some general indication of your knowledge of, and 
experience with, the subject matter will be made. 
Contact: Professor William F. Lasher, Vice 
Provost, The University of Texas at Austin, 512-nnn-
nnnn.  
 Principal Investigator: Michael J. Craigue, (512) 
nnn-nnnn. 
Records retention: With your permission, this 
interview may be tape recorded, and the tape or notes 
will be kept securely in the possession of the 
interviewer (principal investigator) and may be 
reviewed by the interviewer at a future date. The 
interviewer has no intention of releasing these tapes 
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to a third party. You may keep this questionnaire form 
and any cover letters for your records. 
Part One 
1. What is the organizational structure of the 
investment management entity, and what is the nature 
of the relationship between the investment management 
entity and the educational institution that it 
supports? 
2. What is the target asset mix or general 
range for the asset mix (private investments, public  
equities, bonds, cash, real estate, etc.…), and how 
has the target asset mix or general range for the 
asset mix changed over the last 5 years? 
3. How, and to what extent, are external fund 
managers used, and how has that changed over the last 
5 years? 
4. What considerations are given to private 
investments in terms of due diligence and evaluation 
of investments for potential conflict of interest, and 
what sort of supervision or review is made of private  
investment decisions after they are made? 
5. What is the spending policy, and to what 
extent does the educational institution or the 
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investment management entity set that policy? Has that 
spending policy been revisited in light of recent 
dramatic fluctuations in the public equity markets? 
6. What is the investment management entity’s 
written ethics policy, and how is it followed in 
practice? What revisions have been made to the ethics 
policy over the last 5 years, and have any revisions  
been affected by external events? 
7. Does the investment management entity have 
sufficient privacy from public scrutiny in the 
analysis of, and deliberation over, various investment 
instruments, and would the entity’s effectiveness be  
strengthened were it to have greater freedom to 
deliberate in private? 
8. How, and to what extent, does the investment 
management entity interact with the planned giving /  
university development office in terms of setting up 
new gifts? 
9. What sort of reporting is provided to donors 
or foundations to inform them of return on investment 
and other aspects of the endowment management 
function? 
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10. What is the size of the staff, and how has 
the size of the staff changed over the last 3 years? 
11. How would the investment management function 
be different if this entity were an integral part of  
the educational institution it served? In other words, 
what would be the impact on investment management 
effectiveness if the investment management function 
were not exercised by a separate entity? 
12. What is the endowment management entity’s 
policy on the acceptance of new restricted endowments?  
(Are there any limits on the types of restrictions 
that are acceptable, and do restrictions place 
additional burden on the administration of these 
restricted endowments?) 
13. What are the plans for the future? 
Part Two (The following questions were used, according 
to the individual circumstances of the interview.) 
1. What were the conditions at the University 
of Texas System leading to the consideration of a re-
organization in the way that endowments were managed? 
2. What data was collected, or what studies 
were conducted, and by whom, in order to determine the  
best course of action for a re-organization of the 
endowment management function that led to the 
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formation of the University of Texas Investment 
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